According to the "confrontation model," integrated history and philosophy of science operates like an empirical science. It tests philosophical accounts of science against historical case studies much like other sciences test theory against data. However, the confrontation model's critics object that historical facts can neither support generalizations nor genuinely test philosophical theories. Here I argue that most of the model's defects trace to its usual framing in terms of two problematic accounts of empirical inference: the hypothetico-deductive method and enumerative induction. This framing can be taken to suggest an unprofitable one-off confrontation between particular historical facts and general philosophical theories. I outline more recent accounts of empirical inquiry, which describe an iterative back-and-forth movement between concrete (rather than particular) empirical exemplars to their abstract (rather than general) descriptions. Reframed along similar lines, the confrontation model continues to offer both conceptual insight and practical guidance for a naturalized philosophy of science.

中文翻译：

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婚姻场景：历史与科学哲学的对抗模式

根据“对抗模型”，整合的历史和科学哲学的运作就像一门经验科学。它与历史案例研究一样，对科学的哲学解释进行测试，就像其他科学对数据进行理论检验一样。然而，对抗模型的批评者反对历史事实既不能支持概括，也不能真正检验哲学理论。在这里，我认为，该模型的大多数缺陷都是根据经验推断的两个有问题的解释追溯到其通常的框架：假设演绎法和枚举归纳法。这种构架可以用来暗示特定历史事实与一般哲学理论之间的一次无利可图的对抗。我概述了最近的实证研究 它描述了具体的（而不是特定的）经验性示例与其抽象（而不是一般性）描述之间的反复来回运动。对抗模型以类似的方式重新构造，继续为自然化的科学哲学提供概念性见解和实践指导。