abstract:The neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen is famously anti-empiricist in that he denies that sensations can make a definable contribution to knowledge. However, in the second edition of Kant's Theory of Experience (1885), Cohen considers a proposition that contrasts with both his other work and that of his followers: a Kantian who studies scientific claims to truth—and the grounds on which they are made—cannot limit himself to studying mathematics and logical principles, but needs also to investigate underlying presuppositions about the empirical element of science. Due to his subjectivist approach, Cohen argues, Kant not only failed to explain how scientific observation and experiments are possible, but also misconceived the role of the ideas, particularly the idea of a system of nature.

中文翻译：

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赫尔曼·科恩论康德、感觉和科学中的自然

摘要：新康德主义的赫尔曼·科恩是著名的反经验主义者，因为他否认感觉可以对知识做出明确的贡献。然而，在康德的经验理论（1885）的第二版中，科恩考虑了一个与他的其他工作和他的追随者的工作形成对比的命题：一个康德，他研究对真理的科学主张——以及这些主张所依据的基础——不能局限于研究数学和逻辑原理，还需要研究关于科学经验元素的潜在预设。科恩认为，由于他的主观主义方法，康德不仅没有解释科学观察和实验是如何可能的，而且误解了这些观念的作用，尤其是自然系统的观念。