In response to the increasingly popular manipulation argument against compatibilism, some have argued that libertarian accounts of free will are vulnerable to parallel manipulation arguments, and thus manipulation is not uniquely problematic for compatibilists. The main aim of this article is to give this point a more detailed development than it has previously received. Prior attempts to make this point have targeted particular libertarian accounts but cannot be generalized. By contrast, I provide an appropriately modified manipulation that targets all libertarian accounts of freedom and responsibility—an especially tricky task given that libertarian accounts are a motley set. I conclude that if manipulation arguments reveal any theoretical cost then it is one borne by all accounts according to which we are free and responsible, not by compatibilism in particular.

中文翻译：

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操纵论点和自由意志的自由主义账户

针对日益流行的反对相容论的操纵论点，一些人认为自由意志论的自由意志容易受到平行操纵论点的影响，因此操纵对于相容论者来说并不是唯一的问题。本文的主要目的是对这一点进行比以前更详细的发展。先前试图说明这一点的尝试针对的是特定的自由主义帐户，但不能一概而论。相比之下，我提供了一个经过适当修改的操作，针对所有自由主义者对自由和责任的描述——鉴于自由主义者的描述是杂乱无章的，这是一项特别棘手的任务。我的结论是，如果操纵论据揭示了任何理论上的成本，那么它是由所有账户承担的，据此我们是自由和负责任的，