This article aims to build a bridge between two areas of philosophical research: the structure of kinds and metaphysical modality. Our central thesis is that kinds typically involve super-explanatory properties, and that these properties are therefore metaphysically essential to natural kinds. Philosophers of science who work on kinds tend to emphasize their complexity, and are generally resistant to any suggestion that they have essences. The complexities are real enough, but they should not be allowed to obscure the way that kinds are typically unified by certain core properties. We show how this unifying role offers a natural account of why certain properties are metaphysically essential to kinds.

中文翻译：

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基本属性是超级解释：驯服形而上学形态

本文旨在在哲学研究的两个领域之间架起一座桥梁：种类的结构和形而上学的形态。我们的中心论点是类型通常涉及超级解释属性，因此这些属性在形而上学上对自然种类是必不可少的。研究种类的科学哲学家倾向于强调它们的复杂性，并且通常抵制任何关于它们具有本质的建议。复杂性是真实存在的，但不应允许它们掩盖类型通常由某些核心属性统一的方式。我们展示了这种统一角色如何自然地解释为什么某些属性在形而上学上对种类至关重要。