It is commonly held that Calvinism is committed to theological determinism, and therefore also to compatibilism insofar as Calvinism affirms human freedom and moral responsibility. Recent scholarship has challenged this view, opening up space for a form of Calvinism that allows for libertarian free will. In this article we critically assess two versions of ‘libertarian Calvinism’ recently proposed by Oliver Crisp. We contend that Calvinism (defined along the confessional lines adopted by Crisp) is implicitly committed to theological determinism, and even if it were not so committed, it would still rule out libertarian free will on other grounds.

中文翻译：

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决心最自由地来

人们普遍认为，加尔文主义致力于神学决定论，因此也致力于相容论，因为加尔文主义肯定了人类的自由和道德责任。最近的学术研究挑战了这种观点，为一种允许自由意志主义者自由意志的加尔文主义形式开辟了空间。在本文中，我们批判性地评估了 Oliver Crisp 最近提出的“自由主义加尔文主义”的两个版本。我们认为加尔文主义（按照克里斯普所采用的忏悔路线定义）暗中致力于神学决定论，即使它没有如此坚定，它仍然会以其他理由排除自由意志主义者的自由意志。