Logical consequence is typically construed as a metalinguistic relation between (sets of) sentences. Deflationism is an account of logic that challenges this orthodoxy. In Williamson’s recent presentation of deflationism, logic’s primary concern is with universal generalizations over absolutely everything. As well as an interesting account of logic in its own right, deflationism has also been recruited to decide between competing logics in resolving semantic paradoxes. This paper defends deflationism from its most important challenge to date, due to Ole Hjortland. It then presents two new problems for the view. Hjortland’s objection is that deflationism cannot discriminate between distinct logics. I show that his example of classical logic and supervaluationism depends on equivocating about whether the language includes a “definitely” operator. Moreover, I prove a result that blocks this line of objection no matter the choice of logics. I end by criticizing deflationism on two fronts. First, it cannot do the work it has been recruited to perform. That is, it cannot help adjudicate between competing logics. This is because a theory of logic cannot be as easily separated from a theory of truth as its proponents claim. Second, deflationism currently has no adequate answer to the following challenge: what does a sentence’s universal generalization have to do with its logical truth? I argue that the most promising, stipulative response on behalf of the deflationist amounts to an unwarranted change of subject.

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关于逻辑的通货紧缩主义

逻辑结果通常被解释为（组）句子之间的元语言关系。通货紧缩主义是对这种正统观念提出挑战的逻辑解释。在威廉姆森最近对通货紧缩主义的陈述中，逻辑的主要关注点是对绝对一切事物的普遍概括。除了一个有趣的逻辑本身的解释外，紧缩论也被用来在解决语义悖论的竞争逻辑之间做出决定。由于 Ole Hjortland，本文捍卫了通货紧缩主义，使其免受迄今为止最重要的挑战。然后它为视图提出了两个新问题。Hjortland 的反对意见是紧缩论不能区分不同的逻辑。我表明，他的经典逻辑和超值主义的例子取决于对语言是否包含“确定”运算符的模棱两可。此外，我证明了一个结果，无论逻辑选择如何，都可以阻止这一反对意见。最后，我从两个方面批评通货紧缩主义。首先，它无法完成被招募来执行的工作。也就是说，它无法帮助在竞争逻辑之间进行裁决。这是因为逻辑理论不能像其支持者声称的那样容易地与真理理论分开。其次，紧缩论目前对以下挑战没有足够的答案：一个句子的普遍概括与它的逻辑真理有什么关系？我认为，代表紧缩论者的最有希望的、规定性的回应相当于毫无根据地改变主题。它无法完成被招募来执行的工作。也就是说，它无法帮助在竞争逻辑之间进行裁决。这是因为逻辑理论不能像其支持者声称的那样容易地与真理理论分开。其次，紧缩论目前对以下挑战没有足够的答案：一个句子的普遍概括与它的逻辑真理有什么关系？我认为，代表紧缩论者的最有希望的、规定性的回应相当于毫无根据地改变主题。它无法完成被招募来执行的工作。也就是说，它不能帮助在竞争逻辑之间进行裁决。这是因为逻辑理论不能像其支持者声称的那样容易地与真理理论分开。其次，紧缩论目前对以下挑战没有足够的答案：一个句子的普遍概括与它的逻辑真理有什么关系？我认为，代表紧缩论者的最有希望的、规定性的回应相当于毫无根据地改变主题。一个句子的普遍概括与它的逻辑真理有什么关系？我认为，代表紧缩论者的最有希望的、规定性的回应相当于毫无根据地改变主题。一个句子的普遍概括与它的逻辑真理有什么关系？我认为，代表紧缩论者的最有希望的、规定性的回应相当于毫无根据地改变主题。