In Classical Indian philosophy, except Cārvākas all other schools unanimously recognize inference as an instrument of valid knowledge. However, the validity of an inference depends on the validity of hetu and its relation to pakṣa on the one hand and sādhya on the other. If the relation in question is dubious, the inference, which is based on it, turns out to be invalid. In Buddhist epistemology, inference is accepted as a legitimate valid source of knowledge along with perception and they felt it necessary to draw a distinction between proper inference and a fallacious inference. The validity of an inference depends on the validity of the pratijñā and other constituent parts of it. If there is anything wrong with any of its members, the syllogism as a whole becomes fallacious. Hence, there will be as many fallacies of inference as there are fallacies of its component parts, from the first proposition down to the conclusion. Therefore, we may speak of fallacies of the pratijñā, fallacies of hetu, and fallacies of udāharaṇa. Accordingly, in the Buddhist logical tradition Dignāga and Dharmakīrti onward these three kinds of fallacies are recognized. In against to the Buddhist tradition, the Naiyāyikas holds that the fallacies of inference ultimately arise out of the fallacious hetu. The Naiyāyikas bring out the fallacies of inference under the fallacies of the reason (hetvābhāsa) and consider a separate treatment of the inferential fallacies due to the propositum, example, etc. (i.e., pratijñābhāsa, dṛṣṭāntābhāsa) as unnecessary and superfluous. An attempt has been made in this paper to do a philosophical exposition and discuss critically each fallacy with reference to the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists in general and among Buddhist logicians, namely Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in particular.

在印度古典哲学中，除了卡瓦卡斯语外，其他所有流派都一致认为推理是有效知识的工具。然而，推理的有效性取决于有效性河图洛书及其与pakṣa，一方面和sādhya另一方。如果所讨论的关系是可疑的，则基于该关系的推论将被证明是无效的。在佛教认识论中，推理与感知一起被认为是合法的有效知识来源，他们认为有必要在适当的推理与谬误的推理之间进行区分。推论的有效性取决于pratijñā的有效性及其其他组成部分。如果它的任何成员有任何问题，则三段论作为一个整体是错误的。因此，从第一个命题到结论，推理的谬误和其组成部分的谬误一样多。因此，我们可以将的谬误说pratijñā，的谬误河图洛书，与谬误udāharaṇa。因此，在佛教的逻辑传统中，狄尼加（Dignāga）和佛法（Dharmakīrti）起，这三种谬论都得到了认可。与佛教传统相反，Naiyāyikas认为推理的谬误最终源于谬误的黑图。Naiyāyikas在原因的谬误下推论出谬论（hetvābhāsa），并考虑对由于命题而产生的推断性谬论（例如pratijñābhsa，dṛṣṭāntābhsa）进行单独处理是不必要和多余的。本文已尝试做一个哲学的论述，并就奈耶依依卡人和佛教徒，尤其是佛教逻辑学家，尤其是迪尼亚加和达摩harm提之间的批判性批评，进行了批判性地讨论。