Political philosophers often grapple with the issue of the legitimacy of state coercion. Aristotle, a perfectionist, opines that all men hold an objective account of the good life. As regards legitimacy, he entails that state policies are justified only when all its members comprehend the value that has been identified in accordance with the true notion of good. Aristotle argues that the state should facilitate the encouragement of objectively valuable notions of the good. Ronald Dworkin, a neutralist, proposes a specific model of the good life so that one can live well. He holds that certain elements of the ethical conception lead to various notions of the good and, in matters of legitimacy, the state should be neutral towards the notion of good. This is so because A cannot make B’s life better by way of the coercive means of the state. This paper throws light on Aristotle’s and Dworkin’s dialogues on the moral foundations of legitimacy (conceived during their notion of the good life). Therefore, I argue that, in contrast to perfectionism, Dworkin justifies his liberal principle of legitimacy through the idea of state neutrality. But, eventually, Dworkin’s arguments overlook his ethical foundation or admissible towards perfectionism, which is emaciated enough to offer any justification for the principle of legitimacy.

中文翻译：

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美好生活的理念：合法性道德基础的对话

政治哲学家们常常在解决国家强制合法性的问题。亚里士多德（Aristotle）是一个完美主义者，认为所有人都对美好生活有客观的了解。关于合法性，他要求国家政策只有在其所有成员都理解根据真正的善意所确定的价值时才是合理的。亚里斯多德（Aristotle）认为，国家应促进鼓励对客观上有价值的商品概念的鼓励。中立主义者罗纳德·德沃金（Ronald Dworkin）提出了一种特定的美好生活模式，使人们可以过上好生活。他认为，道德观念的某些要素会导致各种善意概念，并且在合法性方面，国家对善意概念应该保持中立。之所以如此，是因为A不能通过国家的强制手段来改善B的生活。本文阐明了亚里士多德和德沃金关于合法性的道德基础的对话（在他们关于美好生活的构想中构想）。因此，我认为，与完美主义相反，德沃金通过国家中立的思想为他的合法性自由主义原则辩护。但是，最终，德沃金的论点忽视了他的道德基础或对完美主义的接受，完美主义已消瘦至极，无法为合法性原则提供任何理由。