This article explores the impact of one of the key non-military events in the U.S. war in Vietnam, at least in the crucial years from 1964 to 1968. During a two-day U.S.–South Vietnamese conference held in Honolulu in early 1966, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk laid out a series of overarching strategic objectives, both military and political, that shaped the allied war effort through the 1968 Tet offensive, and even beyond. The goals outlined at the summit remained the touchstone of U.S. military strategy until they were superseded in 1969 by a policy of “Vietnamization” under the Nixon administration. These political-military objectives, however, suggested a fundamental problem with the U.S. approach to Vietnam, based as it was on a dangerous mixture of naïveté and idealism stemming from faulty assumptions about the efficacy of U.S. power abroad during the Cold War.

中文翻译：

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天堂战争计划：1966 年檀香山会议和越南战争的形态

本文探讨了美国越战中一个关键非军事事件的影响，至少在 1964 年至 1968 年的关键年份中。 在 1966 年初在檀香山举行的为期两天的美国-南越会议期间，国务卿国防部长罗伯特·麦克纳马拉 (Robert S. McNamara) 和国务卿迪恩·腊斯克 (Dean Rusk) 制定了一系列总体战略目标，包括军事和政治方面的战略目标，这些目标塑造了盟军在 1968 年春节攻势期间乃至之后的战争努力。峰会概述的目标一直是美国军事战略的试金石，直到 1969 年尼克松政府的“越南化”政策取代了这些目标。然而，这些政治军事目标表明美国对越南的态度存在根本问题，