In Red Globalization, Oscar Sanchez-Sibony offers a thoughtful and thoughtprovoking reinterpretation of Soviet history. Like other scholars in recent years, Sanchez-Sibony is interested in bringing the USSR into a broader global perspective. His approach is fittingly Soviet, with economics (specifically foreign trade) at the center of his historical analysis. The book’s subtitle suggests an exclusive focus on the Cold War era, but the first chapter presents a well-supported interpretation of the rise of the Stalinist economic order as a response to international economic crisis. In this view, the turn to heavy industry and toward autarky was not so much a fulfillment of a long-lived Bolshevik vision as it was a policy forced by the collapse of European trading patterns in the 1920s. A second chapter on World War II and postwar reconstruction similarly argues that the Soviet Union did not so much turn away from Europe (at least in economic terms) as it was abandoned and isolated by it. The rise of U.S. hegemony in the aftermath of World War II presented numerous challenges to the USSR in the economic sphere. As the postwar world was coming into being, Sibony-Sanchez suggests, Soviet trade officials reached bilateral trade agreements (and many import and export deals) with firms and governments in Western Europe and Japan. But U.S. efforts to create a free-trade world functioning in a multilateral framework and underwritten by a steady, strong, and freely traded dollar sharply curtailed such opportunities. U.S.-led restrictions on Western trade with the Soviet bloc were yet another impediment to the integration of the USSR into the capitalist world economy. Red Globalization suggests the aptness of the 1970s insult that the Soviet Union was little more than “Upper Volta with missiles.” Like the African country now known as Burkina Faso, the USSR faced serious constraints in the open international trading system that emerged under U.S. sponsorship: a perennial shortage of hard currency. In the 1940s and 1950s, the Soviet Union was one of many countries chafing under hard-currency (specifically dollar) constraints. But as the dollar-based world economy expanded, even the poorest West European countries found it easier to trade within the capitalist world than with the USSR. Thus the Soviet Union found itself in a version of the same predicament as Upper Volta and the rest of the Third World: in search of hard currency and with only (or mostly) raw materials to offer in exchange. Soviet manufactured goods were rarely competitive on the world market, and even its primary products often failed on that score too. In this context, superpower status became an added burden. Efforts to win “hearts and minds” in the Third World came at a hefty price tag, as Sanchez-Sibony notes. The Soviet Union and the underdeveloped countries often had similar export profiles, so

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红色全球化：从斯大林到赫鲁晓夫的苏联冷战政治经济学。作者：Oscar Sanchez-Sibony，纽约：剑桥大学出版社，2014 年。278 页。99.00 美元。

在红色全球化中，奥斯卡桑切斯-西博尼对苏联历史进行了深思熟虑和发人深省的重新诠释。与近年来的其他学者一样，桑切斯-西博尼 (Sanchez-Sibony) 有兴趣将苏联带入更广阔的全球视野。他的方法是恰如其分的苏联式，经济学（特别是对外贸易）是他历史分析的中心。这本书的副标题暗示了对冷战时代的独家关注，但第一章对斯大林主义经济秩序的兴起作为对国际经济危机的回应提出了一个得到充分支持的解释。在这种观点中，转向重工业和自给自足与其说是布尔什维克长期愿景的实现，不如说是 1920 年代欧洲贸易模式崩溃所迫使的政策。关于二战和战后重建的第二章同样认为，苏联与其说是远离欧洲（至少在经济方面），不如说是被欧洲抛弃和孤立了。二战后美国霸权的崛起给苏联带来了经济领域的诸多挑战。Sibony-Sanchez 表示，随着战后世界的形成，苏联贸易官员与西欧和日本的公司和政府达成了双边贸易协议（以及许多进出口协议）。但美国在多边框架内建立自由贸易世界的努力，并以稳定、强劲和自由交易的美元为担保，大大减少了这种机会。我们 对西方与苏联集团的贸易限制是苏联融入资本主义世界经济的又一障碍。红色全球化表明 1970 年代对苏联只不过是“拥有导弹的上沃尔特”的侮辱是恰当的。就像现在被称为布基纳法索的非洲国家一样，苏联在美国赞助下出现的开放国际贸易体系中面临着严重的限制：硬通货长期短缺。在 1940 年代和 1950 年代，苏联是受到硬通货（特别是美元）限制的众多国家之一。但随着以美元为基础的世界经济扩张，即使是最贫穷的西欧国家也发现在资本主义世界内进行贸易比与苏联进行贸易更容易。因此，苏联发现自己陷入了与上沃尔特和第三世界其他国家相同的困境：寻找硬通货，并且只（或大部分）提供原材料作为交换。苏联制成品在世界市场上几乎没有竞争力，甚至其初级产品也经常在这一点上失败。在这种背景下，超级大国地位成为了额外的负担。正如 Sanchez-Sibony 指出的那样，在第三世界赢得“民心”的努力付出了沉重的代价。苏联和不发达国家往往有相似的出口情况，所以 在这种背景下，超级大国地位成为了额外的负担。正如 Sanchez-Sibony 指出的那样，在第三世界赢得“民心”的努力付出了沉重的代价。苏联和不发达国家往往有相似的出口情况，所以 在这种背景下，超级大国地位成为了额外的负担。正如 Sanchez-Sibony 指出的那样，在第三世界赢得“民心”的努力付出了沉重的代价。苏联和不发达国家往往有相似的出口情况，所以