In the aftermath of India's first nuclear explosion in 1974, U.S. officials concluded that Brazil posed a growing proliferation risk, and they proposed to target Brazil with a new set of nonproliferation policies that included the denial of fuel-cycle technologies. However, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger expressed doubt that such an approach would curb Brazilian nuclear ambitions. Pushing back against influential voices in the U.S. Congress, the State Department, and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kissinger argued that Brazil should be allowed to proceed with its plans to master the nuclear fuel cycle in exchange for U.S. assistance and new nonproliferation commitments. He justified this attitude on the grounds of alliance politics (Brazil was too important a pillar of U.S. Cold War policy in Latin America) and the interests of key domestic constituencies (U.S. private companies eyed Brazil's burgeoning nuclear industry). The Brazilian government responded well to Kissinger's approach and would have struck a deal if the transition to the Carter administration had not rendered the bargain untenable.

中文翻译：

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“我们不是核不扩散机构”：亨利·基辛格 (Henry Kissinger) 试图容纳核巴西的失败，1974 年至 1977 年

1974 年印度第一次核爆炸后，美国官员得出结论，巴西构成了日益增长的扩散风险，并提议以巴西为目标，制定一套新的不扩散政策，其中包括拒绝使用燃料循环技术。然而，国务卿亨利·基辛格对这种做法能否遏制巴西的核野心表示怀疑。基辛格反对美国国会、国务院和美国军备控制与裁军署的有影响力的声音，认为应该允许巴西继续其掌握核燃料循环的计划，以换取美国的援助和新的不扩散承诺. 他以联盟政治为由为这种态度辩护（巴西是美国的重要支柱）拉丁美洲的冷战政策）和国内主要选民的利益（美国私营公司关注巴西蓬勃发展的核工业）。巴西政府对基辛格的做法反应良好，如果向卡特政府的过渡没有使谈判站不住脚，就会达成协议。