The principle of indifference has fallen from grace in contemporary philosophy, yet some papers have recently sought to vindicate its plausibility. This paper follows suit. In it, I articulate a version of the principle and provide what appears to be a novel argument in favour of it. The argument relies on a thought experiment where, intuitively, an agent’s confidence in any particular outcome being true should decrease with the addition of outcomes to the relevant space of possible outcomes. Put simply: the greater the number of outcomes, the weaker your confidence should be in any one of those outcomes. The argument holds that this intuition favours the principle of indifference. I point out that, in contrast, the intuition is also incompatible with a major alternative to the principle which prescribes imprecise credences: the so-called wide interval view . Consequently, the argument may also be seen as an argument against the wide interval view.

中文翻译：

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无差异原则与宽区间观的论据

冷漠原则在当代哲学中失宠，但最近一些论文试图证明其合理性。本文依循此法。在其中，我阐明了该原则的一个版本，并提供了一个似乎是支持它的新颖论点。该论点依赖于一个思想实验，直觉上，代理对任何特定结果为真的信心应该随着结果添加到可能结果的相关空间而降低。简而言之：结果的数量越多，您对其中任何一个结果的信心就越弱。该论点认为，这种直觉支持冷漠原则。我指出，相比之下，直觉也与规定不精确信任的原则的主要替代方案不相容：所谓宽区间观。因此，该论证也可以被视为反对宽区间观点的论证。