Recent philosophical discourse on emergence has developed with particular concern for the distinction between weak and strong emergence (e.g., Bedau 1997 ; Chalmers 2002 ) and with the primary focus on detailed analysis of the concept of supervenience (e.g., Kim 1984 ; 1999 ; McLaughlin 1997 ). However, in the last decade and as a new departure, attention has been devoted to the distinction between synchronic and diachronic emergence (e.g., Humphreys 2008a , b ; Kirchhoff 2014 ). In this philosophical context, there is an ongoing general belief that these two concepts (diachronic and synchronic) are so different that it is impossible to establish for them a general unifying framework (Humphreys 2016a , b ). It is the purpose of this paper to support an alternative view, i.e. that these concepts are different but not mutually exclusive, and that attending to appearance and persistence can, in this context, lead to an acceptable unifying framework for these two, differing concepts of emergence.

中文翻译：

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作为出现的历时和共时概念的统一的出现和持续

最近关于涌现的哲学论述特别关注弱涌现和强涌现之间的区别（例如，Bedau 1997 ; Chalmers 2002 ）并且主要关注对随附概念的详细分析（例如，Kim 1984 ; 1999 ; McLaughlin 1997 ）。然而，在过去的十年中，作为一个新的出发点，共时和历时出现之间的区别一直受到关注（例如，Humphreys 2008a，b；Kirchhoff 2014）。在这种哲学背景下，人们普遍认为这两个概念（历时和共时）是如此不同，以至于不可能为它们建立一个普遍的统一框架（Humphreys 2016a，b）。本文的目的是支持另一种观点，即这些概念不同但并不相互排斥，