The plausibility—though not the soundness—of William Lane Craig’s deductive moral argument for God’s existence has been insightfully challenged by David Baggett, who prefers to formulate the argument abductively. This paper proposes a way of couching and defending Craig’s argument so as to avoid the potholes Baggett identifies and preserve the value of the deductive form of the argument. Central to this proposal is justifying key criteria that any adequate ontological foundation for objective moral values and duties must possess, highlighting key insights in the history of moral apologetics that support these criteria. Defending the argument in this way both avoids the sting of Baggett’s critiques and offers what amounts to a cumulative case of ontologically focused moral arguments.

中文翻译：

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增加威廉·莱恩·克雷格 (William Lane Craig) 演绎道德论证的合理性的建议

威廉·莱恩·克雷格 (William Lane Craig) 对上帝存在的演绎道德论证的合理性——尽管不是合理的——受到了大卫·巴格特 (David Baggett) 的深刻挑战，大卫·巴格特 (David Baggett) 更喜欢以溯因的方式来阐述论证。本文提出了一种表达和捍卫克雷格论证的方法，以避免巴格特识别的坑洼，并保持论证的演绎形式的价值。该提案的核心是证明客观道德价值观和义务的任何适当本体论基础必须具备的关键标准，强调支持这些标准的道德护教学历史上的关键见解。以这种方式为论证辩护既避免了巴格特批评的刺痛，又提供了相当于本体论聚焦的道德论证的累积案例。