Why do states enter into treaties? In literature on the investment regime, the dominant answer is that investment treaties provide credible commitments to foreign investors. This narrative provides valuable insights but cannot account for the historical origins of the treaties, where drafters explicitly decided to exclude ‘strong’ dispute settlement provisions. Unlike modern- day investment treaties, the early investment treaty regime did not allow investors to file claims against host states through investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). Using historical evidence from three major capital exporting states – the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany – the article shows that this was a conscious design choice. Rather than providing formal dispute settlement, sanctions and penalties to make credible commitments, Western states intended investment treaties to serve as salient focal points for the informal resolution of investment disputes. The substantive obligations were expected to fulfil their coordinating role without the shadow of judicialized dispute settlement. The argument is not just of historical interest but has broader implications for literature on international economic law dominated by the credible commitment narrative, as well as the current political backlash against ISDS.

中文翻译：

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超越承诺的承诺：作为投资重点的（投资）条约

国家为什么要签订条约？在有关投资制度的文献中，主要的答案是投资条约向外国投资者提供了可靠的承诺。该叙述提供了宝贵的见解，但不能解释条约的历史渊源，因为起草者明确决定排除“强力”争端解决规定。与现代投资条约不同，早期投资条约制度不允许投资者通过投资者与国家间的争端解决（ISDS）向东道国提出索赔。利用来自三个主要资本输出国（美国，英国和德国）的历史证据，文章表明这​​是一种有意识的设计选择。与其提供正式的争端解决，制裁和惩罚以作出可信的承诺，西方国家打算将投资条约作为非正式解决投资争端的重要联络点。预期实质性义务将在没有司法解决争端的阴影的情况下履行其协调作用。该论点不仅具有历史意义，而且对以可信的承诺叙事以及当前对ISDS的政治冲击为主导的国际经济法文献具有更广泛的意义。