IMF loans during times of financial crisis often occur in conjunction with bilateral financial rescues. These bilateral bailouts are substantial in size and a central component of international cooperation during financial crises. We analyze the political economy of bilateral bailouts and study the trade-offs that potential creditor governments experience when other countries find themselves in financial distress. Creditor governments want to stabilize crisis countries by providing additional liquidity, particularly if the crisis country is economically or politically important to them, but they are constrained by domestic politics. Politicians aim to balance these countervailing pressures. They provide bailouts when their own economy is exposed to negative spillover effects and when the crisis country is important for geostrategic, military, or political reasons. Domestic economic and political constraints, on the other hand, limit their ability to bail out other countries. We test our hypotheses using an original data set on bilateral bailouts by the G7 countries to countries that experienced financial crises between 1975 and 2010. The findings of our statistical analysis support our theoretical argument and contribute to a deeper understanding of international cooperation's complex structure during financial crises.

中文翻译：

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双边救助的政治经济学

金融危机期间的国际货币基金组织贷款通常与双边金融救助同时发生。这些双边救助规模巨大，是金融危机期间国际合作的核心组成部分。我们分析双边救助的政治经济学，并研究潜在债权国政府在其他国家陷入财务困境时所经历的权衡取舍。债权国政府希望通过提供额外的流动性来稳定危机国家，特别是如果危机国家在经济或政治上对它们很重要，但它们受到国内政治的限制。政客们的目标是平衡这些反补贴压力。当他们自己的经济受到负面溢出效应以及危机国家对地缘战略、军事、或政治原因。另一方面，国内经济和政治约束限制了它们救助其他国家的能力。我们使用 G7 国家对 1975 年至 2010 年间经历金融危机的国家的双边救助的原始数据集来检验我们的假设。我们的统计分析结果支持了我们的理论论点，并有助于更深入地理解金融危机期间国际合作的复杂结构。危机。