Policies to mitigate global climate change entail significant economic costs. Yet a growing number of firms lobby in favor of regulation to mitigate carbon emissions. Why do firms support environmental regulations that directly increase production costs? This question is all the more puzzling in a globalized economy where regulation may undermine the competitiveness of domestic firms at home and abroad. By imposing differential costs on participants in the domestic market, policies designed to mitigate carbon emissions shift market share toward firms with low anticipated adjustment costs. I develop and test a model of climate change policymaking in the presence of market competition and open borders. Heterogeneity in adjustment costs induces a preference for regulation among low-cost firms. Firms facing import pressure—or export competition—may prefer stringent regulation if costs are sufficiently asymmetric. Firms embedded in global value chains also benefit if regulation raises the costs of domestically produced intermediate goods.

中文翻译：

---

我的敌人的敌人：当公司支持气候变化监管时

减缓全球气候变化的政策需要付出巨大的经济代价。然而，越来越多的公司游说赞同，支持，受赏识，有利减少碳排放的监管。为什么企业支持直接增加生产成本的环境法规？这个问题在全球化经济中更加令人费解，监管可能会削弱国内企业在国内外的竞争力。通过对国内市场的参与者施加不同的成本，旨在减少碳排放的政策将市场份额转移到预期调整成本较低的公司。我在市场竞争和开放边界的情况下开发并测试了气候变化政策制定模型。调整成本的异质性导致了低成本公司对监管的偏好。如果成本足够不对称，面临进口压力或出口竞争的公司可能更喜欢严格的监管。