Using Norwegian survey experiments (N1⁄4 1,541), we examined the relationship between Islamist terrorist threats and trust in out-groups, focusing on how this relationship was conditioned by the ‘‘motivation to control prejudice’’ (MCP) and emotions of anxiety. After exposure to a news story describing an Islamist threat scenario, the treatment group reported higher levels of trust in out-groups than the control group. High levels of MCP were linked to higher levels of trust; anxiety played an ambiguous role. Although anxiety had a strong negative effect on trust in out-groups, the positive effect of MCP increased with rising anxiety levels, thus making the people who were most scared also more trusting. Activation of social norms may, thus, bolster distrust. In a Europe characterized by civil unrest and the rise of authoritarian populism, there is a widespread concern that we may be moving toward more fearful and polarized societies, with increasing levels of intolerance and distrust toward immigrants in general and Muslims in particular. The reasons for these developments are complex, and related to long-term economic and political trends. In the past few years, the threat of terrorism has emerged as a primary factor that may serve to deepen and aggravate existing cultural and political cleavages. Previous acts of terrorism have been shown to negatively affect the attitudes of people toward Muslims as well as other minority groups (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006; Traugott et al., 2002); as a All correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Kari Steen-Johnsen, PhD, Research Director, Institute for Social Research, Pb.3233 Elisenberg, 0208 Oslo, Norway. E-mail: ksj@samfunnsforskning.no D ow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /ijpor/advance-articleoi/10.1093/ijpor/edz014/5614229 by Instttgruppa or am funnorskning Biboteket user on 19 N ovem er 2019 result, these acts have increased public support for hawkish policies and for curbing of civil liberties (Hetherington & Nelson, 2003; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005). This study uses a survey experiment to examine the effect of an assumed Islamist terrorist threat on trust in Muslims and immigrants as ‘‘connoted outgroups’’, with emphasis on the roles played by social norms and on the anxiety that the threat provokes. By the term ‘‘connoted out-groups’’, we refer to groups that tend to be associated with a given type of terrorism in public discourse, and in this case specifically, to Muslims and immigrants who are being associated with Islamist terrorism. Studies of terrorist threats have pointed to the importance of the cultural norms that are evoked in relation to terrorism—especially how such norms may serve to prevent the development of general prejudice toward certain ethnic, cultural, or religious groups (Harteveld & Ivarsflaten, 2016; Nugier et al., 2016; Wollebæk, Steen-Johnsen, Enjolras, & Ødegård, 2013). Other studies have indicated that emotions of anxiety and anger have strong roles to play in shaping political and attitudinal responses in the population (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015; Huddy et al., 2005; Vasilopoulos, Marcus & Foucault, 2018). Recently, a growing literature also seeks to examine the interaction among emotions, norms, and cognition in explaining outcomes in terms of political attitudes (Kentmen-Cin & Erisen, 2017; Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson, 2010; Vasilopoulou & Wagner, 2017). Emotions of anxiety have been shown to influence opinions in different stages of the opinion formation process, both related to initial attitudes, and to seeking and evaluating information (Vasilopoulou & Wagner, 2017). Anxiety can also influence motivated reasoning processes by creating an ‘‘affective tipping point’’, where people are willing to consider new information more openly (Redlawsk et al., 2010). This article contributes to this emergent literature on the relationships among emotions, social norms, and cognition in shaping attitudinal outcomes. We focus on the role of a particular social norm—the motivation to control prejudice (MCP), which motivates people to ‘‘avoid acting on biases against stigmatized minorities’’ (Blinder, Ford, & Ivarsflaten, 2013, p. 842)—and on how the activation of this norm is conditioned by the emotion of anxiety. Whenever MCP is activated, the theory suggests that people will be more inclined to engage in controlled cognitive activity, and to examine their attitudes more explicitly and systematically. Whereas previous studies have established a negative link between MCP and the development of prejudiced attitudes (Blinder et al., 2013; Harteveld & Ivarsflaten, 2016; Ivarsflaten, Blinder, & Ford, 2010), this study further develops MCP theory by examining how the activation of the norm may be conditioned by the emotion of anxiety. In the following sections, we first lay out our perspective on social trust and how the threat of terrorism affects it; then, we specify the potential roles I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F P U B L I C O P I N I O N R E S E A R C H 2 D ow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /ijpor/advance-articleoi/10.1093/ijpor/edz014/5614229 by Instttgruppa or am funnorskning Biboteket user on 19 N ovem er 2019 of MCP and emotions. Based on existing theoretical and empirical insights, we develop a set of hypotheses to be tested. Next, we describe the survey experiments and the methods used before presenting and discussing the results of our analysis. Theoretical Approach The Impact of Terrorism on Social Trust Social trust can be defined as the ‘‘belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm, if they can avoid it, and will look after our interests, if this is possible’’ (Newton, 2007, p. 343). There exist a variety of theories of trust, conceiving of it either as based on rational calculation (Coleman, 1990; Hardin, 1993), on personal experience and socialization (Allport, 1954; Uslaner, 2002), or on societal factors such as a just and fair state (Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005) and the presence of an organized civil society (Putnam, 2000). The relationship between large-scale disruptive events such as terrorism and social trust has been theorized only to a limited extent. If we look at the question of social reactions to disruptive events in broad terms, however, a heightened sense of community within the in-group, that is, people with whom you share identities, religion, or ethnicity, combined with skepticism to the out-group seems to be the most general pattern (Hawdon & Ryan, 2011; Traugott et al., 2002). Several studies have indeed shown that people become more anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant following a terrorist attack (see Doosje, Zimmermann, Küpper, Zick, & Meertens, 2010; Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006; Van de Vyver, Houston, Abrams, & Vasiljevic, 2016). Findings are mixed, however, and they vary across time and context. While some studies of reactions to the 2015–2016 wave of Islamic terrorism in Europe found an increase in prejudice (Cohu, Maisonneuve, & Testé, 2016; Solheim, 2017) and authoritarianism (Vasilopoulos, Marcus, & Foucault, 2018), a set of studies have demonstrated a lack of effect on immigration attitudes and xenophobia (Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Foucault, 2018; Castanho Silva, 2018; Cohu et al., 2016; Economou & Kollias, 2019). Some studies also indicate that under certain conditions, social trust may in fact be strengthened in the context of terrorist attacks (Arvanitidis, Economou, & Kollias, 2016; Wollebæk, Enjolras, Steen-Johnsen, & Ødegård, 2012). The Norwegian reaction to the 22nd of July attacks forms the most distinct example of such a reaction, since here, both generalized social trust and trust in people with different religions and nationalities increased right after the attacks (Wollebæk et al., 2012). Such effects tend, however, to be short lived (Arvanitidis et al., 2016; Wollebæk et al., 2013). I S L A M I S T T E R R O R I S M , O U T G R O U P T R U S T , A N D M C P 3 D ow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /ijpor/advance-articleoi/10.1093/ijpor/edz014/5614229 by Instttgruppa or am funnorskning Biboteket user on 19 N ovem er 2019 Theoretically, one can imagine a set of different mechanisms behind an eventual increase or decrease in social trust when faced with a terrorist threat. From a social-psychological perspective, both Attachment Theory (Nakonezny & Reddick, 2004) and Terror Management Theory (TMT) have argued that fear induced by terror may lead to a process of pulling together with kin or with those persons with whom you feel culturally or socially affiliated (Greenberg et al., 2003). This emotional response might, in turn, involve distrust in groups outside of the in-group. According to TMT, a core mechanism in shaping out-group hostility—and also, authoritarianism—is the experience of mortality (i.e. one’s own mortality is made salient by the terrorist threat (Greenberg et al., 2003)). More recent studies within the TMT framework have, however, also indicated that in a situation of fear, the evocation of core aspects of a person’s positive worldviews may curb the negative effects of threats (Motyl et al., 2011; Nugier et al., 2016). In the context of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in 2015, Nugier et al. (2016, p. 80) conducted an experiment showing that the evocation of the core French value of ‘‘colorblind equality’’ made respondents less likely to see immigration as a symbolic threat. Several studies indeed indicate that the values and norms that are evoked in society in the context of a terrorist threat may be of importance to attitudinal responses (Gross, Brewer, & Aday, 2009; Nugier et al., 2016; Wollebæk et al., 2012, 2013). For example, the increase in out-group trust after the right-wing extremist attacks of 22nd of July in Norway can be attributed to the existing high levels of institutional and social trust prior to the attacks (Wollebæk et al., 2012). Those with the

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伊斯兰恐怖主义、群体外信任和控制偏见的动机

使用挪威调查实验 (N1⁄4 1,541)，我们研究了伊斯兰恐怖主义威胁与对外部群体的信任之间的关系，重点关注这种关系如何受到“控制偏见的动机”(MCP) 和焦虑情绪的制约. 在接触了描述伊斯兰主义威胁情景的新闻报道后，治疗组报告说对外部群体的信任程度高于对照组。高水平的 MCP 与更高水平的信任有关；焦虑起了模棱两可的作用。虽然焦虑对外群体的信任有很强的负面影响，但 MCP 的积极影响随着焦虑水平的升高而增加，从而使最害怕的人也更加信任。因此，激活社会规范可能会加剧不信任。在一个以内乱和威权民粹主义兴起为特征的欧洲，人们普遍担心，我们可能正在走向更加可怕和两极分化的社会，对移民尤其是穆斯林的不容忍和不信任程度越来越高。这些发展的原因很复杂，并且与长期的经济和政治趋势有关。在过去几年中，恐怖主义威胁已成为可能加深和加剧现有文化和政治分歧的主要因素。先前的恐怖主义行为已被证明会对人们对穆斯林和其他少数群体的态度产生负面影响（Echebarria-Echabe 和 Fernández-Guede，2006 年；Traugott 等人，2002 年）；作为与本文有关的所有信函应寄给社会研究所研究主任 Kari Steen-Johnsen 博士，Pb.3233 Elisenberg，0208 Oslo，挪威。电子邮件： ksj@samfunnsforskning.no Dow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /ijpor/advance-articleoi/10.1093/ijpor/edz014/5614229 来自 Instttgruppa 或在 19 N10ov 上是 funnorskning Biboteket 用户这些行为增加了公众对鹰派政策和限制公民自由的支持（Hetherington & Nelson, 2003; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005）。本研究使用一项调查实验来检验假定的伊斯兰恐怖主义威胁对穆斯林和移民作为“隐含的外群体”的信任的影响，重点是社会规范所扮演的角色以及威胁引发的焦虑。术语“隐含的外群体”是指在公共话语中倾向于与特定类型的恐怖主义相关联的群体，在这种情况下，具体而言，与伊斯兰恐怖主义有关联的穆斯林和移民。对恐怖主义威胁的研究指出了与恐怖主义有关的文化规范的重要性——尤其是这些规范如何有助于防止对某些种族、文化或宗教群体的普遍偏见的发展（Harteveld 和 Ivarsflaten，2016 年； Nugier 等人，2016 年；Wollebæk、Steen-Johnsen、Enjolras 和 Ødegård，2013 年）。其他研究表明，焦虑和愤怒情绪在塑造人群的政治和态度反应方面发挥着重要作用（Albertson & Gadarian，2015；Huddy 等，2005；Vasilopoulos、Marcus & Foucault，2018）。最近，越来越多的文献也试图研究情绪、规范、以及从政治态度角度解释结果的认知（Kentmen-Cin 和 Erisen，2017 年；Redlawsk、Civettini 和 Emmerson，2010 年；Vasilopoulou 和 Wagner，2017 年）。焦虑情绪已被证明会影响意见形成过程的不同阶段的意见，这既与初始态度有关，也与寻求和评估信息有关 (Vasilopoulou & Wagner, 2017)。焦虑还可以通过创造“情感临界点”来影响动机推理过程，人们愿意更公开地考虑新信息（Redlawsk 等，2010）。本文为有关情绪、社会规范和认知在塑造态度结果之间的关系的新兴文献做出了贡献。我们关注特定社会规范的作用——控制偏见的动机 (MCP)，这促使人们“避免对受到污名化的少数群体的偏见采取行动”（Blinder、Ford 和 Ivarsflaten，2013 年，第 842 页）——以及这种规范的激活如何受到焦虑情绪的制约。每当 MCP 被激活时，该理论表明人们将更倾向于参与受控的认知活动，并更明确和系统地检查他们的态度。先前的研究已经在 MCP 与偏见态度的发展之间建立了负相关（Blinder 等人，2013 年；Harteveld 和 Ivarsflaten，2016 年；Ivarsflaten、Blinder 和 Ford，2010 年），本研究通过检查规范的激活可能受焦虑情绪的制约。在以下部分中，我们首先阐述了我们对社会信任以及恐怖主义威胁如何影响它的看法；然后，我们指定潜在的角色 INTERNATIONALJOURNATIONALJOURNALO FPUBLICOPINIONRESEARC H 2 D ow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /ijpor/advance-articleoi/10.1093/ijpor/edz014/5614229 by Instttgruppa 或 am funnorskoving1950000000B0bot MCP 和情绪。基于现有的理论和经验见解，我们开发了一组待检验的假设。接下来，在介绍和讨论我们的分析结果之前，我们描述了调查实验和使用的方法。理论方法恐怖主义对社会信任的影响社会信任可以定义为“相信其他人不会故意或故意伤害我们，如果他们能够避免，并且会照顾我们的利益，如果这是可能的”（牛顿，2007 年，第 343 页）。存在多种信任理论，将其设想为基于理性计算（Coleman，1990；Hardin，1993）、基于个人经验和社会化（Allport，1954；Uslaner，2002），或基于社会因素，例如公正和公平的国家 (Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005) 和有组织的公民社会的存在 (Putnam, 2000)。恐怖主义等大规模破坏性事件与社会信任之间的关系仅在有限程度上被理论化。然而，如果我们从广义上看待对破坏性事件的社会反应问题，则是在群体内，即与您共享身份、宗教或种族的人中高度的社区意识，与对外部群体的怀疑相结合似乎是最普遍的模式（Hawdon & Ryan，2011 年；Traugott 等人，2002 年）。几项研究确实表明，人们在遭受恐怖袭击后变得更加反穆斯林和反移民（参见 Doosje、Zimmermann、Küpper、Zick 和 Meertens，2010 年；Echebarria-Echabe 和 Fernández-Guede，2006 年；Van de Vyver，休斯顿、艾布拉姆斯和瓦西列维奇，2016 年）。然而，结果喜忧参半，并且随着时间和背景的不同而有所不同。虽然一些关于 2015-2016 年欧洲伊斯兰恐怖主义浪潮反应的研究发现偏见（Cohu、Maisonneuve 和 Testé，2016 年；Solheim，2017 年）和威权主义（Vasilopoulos、Marcus 和 Foucault，2018 年）有所增加，但的研究表明对移民态度和仇外心理缺乏影响（Brouard、Vasilopoulos 和 Foucault，2018 年；卡斯塔尼奥·席尔瓦，2018 年；Cohu 等人，2016 年；Economou 和 Kollias，2019 年）。一些研究还表明，在某些情况下，在恐怖袭击的背景下，社会信任实际上可能会得到加强（Arvanitidis、Economou 和 Kollias，2016 年；Wollebæk、Enjolras、Steen-Johnsen 和 Ødegård，2012 年）。挪威对 7 月 22 日袭击的反应形成了这种反应最明显的例子，因为在这里，普遍的社会信任和对不同宗教和国籍的人的信任在袭击发生后立即增加（Wollebæk 等，2012）。然而，这种影响往往是短暂的（Arvanitidis 等人，2016 年；Wollebæk 等人，2013 年）。ISLAMISTTERRORISM , OUTGROUPTRUST , ANDMCP 3 Dow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /ijpor/advance-articleoi/10。1093/ijpor/edz014/5614229 由 Instttgruppa 或 am funnorskning Biboteket 用户于 2019 年 11 月 19 日从理论上讲，当面临恐怖主义威胁时，人们可以想象在最终增加或减少社会信任的背后有一组不同的机制。从社会心理学的角度来看，依恋理论 (Nakonezny & Reddick, 2004) 和恐怖管理理论 (TMT) 都认为，由恐怖引起的恐惧可能会导致与亲属或与你有文化感受的人团结在一起的过程或社会附属（格林伯格等人，2003 年）。反过来，这种情绪反应可能涉及对内部群体之外的群体的不信任。根据 TMT 的说法，塑造外群体敌意以及威权主义的核心机制是死亡体验（即 恐怖主义威胁使一个人的死亡变得突出（Greenberg et al., 2003））。然而，最近在 TMT 框架内的研究也表明，在恐惧的情况下，唤起一个人积极世界观的核心方面可能会抑制威胁的负面影响（Motyl 等，2011；Nugier 等， 2016）。在 2015 年巴黎查理周刊袭击事件的背景下，Nugier 等人。(2016, p. 80) 进行的一项实验表明，法国核心价值观“色盲平等”的唤起使受访者不太可能将移民视为一种象征性威胁。一些研究确实表明，在恐怖主义威胁的背景下，社会中唤起的价值观和规范可能对态度反应很重要（Gross, Brewer, & Aday, 2009; Nugier et al., 2016; Wollebæk et al., 2012 年、2013 年）。例如，挪威 7 月 22 日右翼极端主义袭击后群体外信任的增加可归因于袭击前现有的高水平机构和社会信任（Wollebæk 等，2012）。那些与