Intersectionality, frequently used by political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists as a highly abstract concept, originated as the socio-legal critique, by Kimberlé Crenshaw, of US courts’ ignorance of discrimination against Black Women specifically. That ignorance emerged in cases such as DeGraffenreid, in which the claimants challenged a collective redundancy scheme resulting in dismissing all Black Women on grounds of indirect discrimination. The court refused to recognise Black Women as a category of relevance and did not find any discrimination because the scheme did not impact disproportionally on White Women or Black Men. As regards EU law, some socio-legal scholars of today doubt that intersectionality has any value as a practically relevant concept. This article discusses the question whether and how intersectionality can and should be used in applying EU non-discrimination law through a critical analysis of three ECJ rulings delivered between 24 November 2016 and 14 March 2017. The Parris case concerning the pension claims of two white homosexual Men can be qualified as the Court’s “DeGraffenreid moment” because it refused to recognise discrimination in a case where the intersection of being over 63 and homosexual was the basis of excluding the Men from a survivor’s pension. The Court refused to recognise combined discrimination and found that neither age nor sexual orientation in isolation were the reason of that exclusion. The more recent Achbita and Bougnaoui cases seem to constitute instances of surprising ignorance of racializing Muslim Women through penalising them for wearing a headscarf: The Court, following its Avocates Générales, refused to protect Women against dismissal on grounds of that garment on the basis of extensive justifications for religious discrimination, thus ignoring a pervasive exclusion on the intersection of gender and ascribed race. The article criticises all three rulings with a twofold argument. First, it is submitted that anti-discrimination law should and can recognise intersectional discrimination without losing its focus by a reconceptualization around the nodes gender, race and disability. Second, it is argued that EU anti-discrimination law can be interpreted to encompass this concept by using a purposive interpretation.

中文翻译：

---

在法院 (EU) 上使用、误用和不使用交叉性

交叉性经常被政治学家、社会学家和人类学家用作高度抽象的概念，起源于金伯利·克伦肖 (Kimberlé Crenshaw) 对美国法院特别无知歧视黑人妇女的社会法律批评。这种无知出现在 DeGraffenreid 等案件中，索赔人对集体裁员计划提出质疑，该计划导致以间接歧视为由解雇所有黑人女性。法院拒绝承认黑人女性是一个相关类别，也没有发现任何歧视，因为该计划并未对白人女性或黑人男性产生不成比例的影响。关于欧盟法律，当今的一些社会法律学者怀疑交叉性作为一个实际相关的概念是否具有任何价值。本文通过对 2016 年 11 月 24 日至 2017 年 3 月 14 日期间作出的三项欧洲法院裁决的批判性分析，讨论了在适用欧盟非歧视法时是否以及如何使用交叉性的问题。 关于两名白人同性恋者的养老金索赔的帕里斯案男子可以被称为法院的“DeGraffenreid 时刻”，因为它拒绝承认在 63 岁以上和同性恋的交叉点是将男子排除在遗属养老金之外的基础上的歧视。法院拒绝承认混合歧视，并认为孤立的年龄或性取向都不是这种排斥的原因。最近的 Achbita 和 Bougnaoui 案件似乎构成了通过惩罚穆斯林妇女戴头巾而将其种族化的令人惊讶的无知实例：法院根据其 Avocates Générales，拒绝保护妇女免于因戴头巾而被解雇，理由是广泛宗教歧视的理由，从而忽略了对性别和归属种族交叉点的普遍排斥。文章以双重论据批评了所有三项裁决。首先，反歧视法应该并且可以通过围绕性别、种族和残疾节点的重新概念化来承认交叉歧视，而不会失去其重点。其次，有人认为欧盟反歧视法可以通过有目的的解释来解释为包含这一概念。法院遵循其 Avocates Générales，以宗教歧视的广泛理由为由，拒绝保护妇女免于因穿着这件衣服而被解雇，从而忽略了对性别和归属种族交叉的普遍排斥。文章以双重论据批评了所有三项裁决。首先，反歧视法应该并且可以通过围绕性别、种族和残疾节点的重新概念化来承认交叉歧视，而不会失去其重点。其次，有人认为欧盟反歧视法可以通过有目的的解释来解释为包含这一概念。法院遵循其 Avocates Générales，以宗教歧视的广泛理由为由，拒绝保护妇女免于因穿着这件衣服而被解雇，从而忽略了对性别和归属种族交叉的普遍排斥。文章以双重论据批评了所有三项裁决。首先，反歧视法应该并且可以通过围绕性别、种族和残疾节点的重新概念化来承认交叉歧视，而不会失去其重点。其次，有人认为欧盟反歧视法可以通过有目的的解释来解释为包含这一概念。因此忽略了对性别和归属种族交叉点的普遍排斥。文章以双重论据批评了所有三项裁决。首先，反歧视法应该并且可以通过围绕性别、种族和残疾节点的重新概念化来承认交叉歧视，而不会失去其重点。其次，有人认为欧盟反歧视法可以通过有目的的解释来解释为包含这一概念。因此忽略了对性别和归属种族交叉点的普遍排斥。文章以双重论据批评了所有三项裁决。首先，反歧视法应该并且可以通过围绕性别、种族和残疾节点的重新概念化来承认交叉歧视，而不会失去其重点。其次，有人认为欧盟反歧视法可以通过有目的的解释来解释为包含这一概念。