It is an alleged virtue of Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism ( ED ) that it makes available a promising line of resistance against the sceptic about perceptual knowledge. According to Jose Zalabardo’s reconstruction of it, however, this line of resistance—in particular, the solution it supplies to what Pritchard calls the Evidential Problem—is ultimately flawed. Whether or not the solution criticized by Zalabardo is the one supplied by ED —which Pritchard has denied—my aim in this paper is to show that Zalabardo’s criticism of this solution fails. To begin with, I show that it is based on excessively demanding epistemic principles. Moreover, I argue that on a more plausible epistemic principle Zalabardo’s conclusion doesn’t go through.

中文翻译：

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扎拉巴尔多论普里查德和证据问题

普里查德的认识论分离主义 (ED) 所谓的优点是它提供了一条有希望的路线来对抗对知觉知识的怀疑论者。然而，根据何塞·扎拉巴尔多对其的重建，这条抵抗线——特别是它为普里查德所说的证据问题提供的解决方案——最终是有缺陷的。无论 Zalabardo 批评的解决方案是否是 ED 提供的解决方案——Pritchard 否认了这一点——我在本文中的目的是表明 Zalabardo 对这个解决方案的批评是​​失败的。首先，我表明它基于过分苛刻的认知原则。此外，我认为，根据一个更合理的认知原则，Zalabardo 的结论没有通过。