This paper presents an original, ambitious, truth-directed transcendental argument for the existence of an ‘external world’. It begins with a double-headed starting-point: Stroud’s own remarks on the necessary conditions of language in general, and Hegel’s critique of the “fear of error.” The paper argues that the sceptical challenge requires a particular critical concept of thought as that which may diverge from reality, and that this concept is possible only through reflection on situations of error, in which how things are thought (or experienced) to be diverges from how things really are with independent items in an objective world. The existence of such a world is therefore a necessary condition of the possibility of scepticism: such scepticism is therefore false. I defend the argument against objections from Stroud’s sceptic and others. Drawing on Heidegger, the paper concludes by indicating that the chain of necessary conditions includes practical engagement with the world.

中文翻译：

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斯特劳德、黑格尔、海德格尔：先验论证

本文为“外部世界”的存在提出了一个原创的、雄心勃勃的、以真理为导向的先验论证。它从一个双重出发点开始：斯特劳德自己对一般语言必要条件的评论，以及黑格尔对“对错误的恐惧”的批判。该论文认为，怀疑性挑战需要一个特定的批判性思维概念，因为它可能与现实背道而驰，而这个概念只有通过对错误情况的反思才有可能，在这种情况下，事情被认为（或经历）是如何偏离现实的。客观世界中具有独立项的事物究竟是怎样的。因此，这样一个世界的存在是怀疑论可能性的必要条件：因此这种怀疑论是错误的。我为反对斯特劳德的怀疑论者和其他人的反对意见辩护。