The two main components of Coliva’s view are Moderatism and Extended Rationality. According to Moderatism, a belief about specific material objects is perceptually justified iff, absent defeaters, one has the appropriate course of experience and it is assumed that there is an external world. I grant Moderatism and instead focus on Extended Rationality, according to which it is epistemically rational to believe evidentially warranted propositions and to accept those unwarrantable assumptions that make the acquisition of perceptual warrants possible and are therefore constitutive of ordinary evidential warrants. I suggest that, even though Extended Rationality might be true, it cannot do the work that Coliva wants it to do. Although my objections do not show that it is false, they can serve to clarify what sorts of problem a theory of justification or rationality could possibly address. This provides an alternative to Coliva’s view of the skeptical problem and the question, on what does rationality hinge?

中文翻译：

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理性取决于什么？

Coliva 观点的两个主要组成部分是温和主义和扩展理性。根据温和主义，关于特定物质对象的信念在知觉上是合理的，如果没有失败者，一个人有适当的经验过程，并且假设有一个外部世界。我赞同温和主义，而是专注于扩展理性，据此，相信有证据保证的命题并接受那些使获得感性保证成为可能并因此构成普通证据保证的无根据假设是认识论上理性的。我建议，即使扩展理性可能是真的，它也不能完成 Coliva 想要它做的工作。虽然我的反对并不表明这是错误的，它们可以用来阐明正当性或合理性理论可能解决什么样的问题。这为 Coliva 对怀疑问题的观点和问题提供了一种替代方案，即合理性取决于什么？