Schelling’s views of evil in Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom is usually thought of as a radicalization of Kant’s argument for the propensity to evil in human nature in Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason. In this paper, I argue that (1) Kant does not provide a full transcendental deduction for the ground of evil in human nature because this would give a rational reason for there to be evil (i.e. evil would not be its own ground), (2) Schelling provides a theological–metaphysical reconstruction of Kant’s argument by providing a non-rational ground (Unground) for evil and (3) the difference between Kant and Schelling lies in how they conceive of the actualization of the ground of evil—through intelligible deed or protohistorical choice—which has repercussions for how they think of conversion.

中文翻译：

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康德和谢林在邪恶的基础上

谢林在《关于人类自由本质的哲学探究》中关于邪恶的观点通常被认为是康德关于在纯粹理性范围内的宗教中人性趋于邪恶的论点的激进化。在这篇论文中，我认为 (1) 康德没有为人性中的恶的根据提供一个完整的先验演绎，因为这会给存在恶提供一个合理的理由（即恶不会是它自己的根据），（ 2) 谢林通过为邪恶提供一个非理性的基础 (Unground)，对康德的论点进行了神学-形而上学的重建；(3) 康德和谢林之间的区别在于他们如何设想邪恶的基础的实现——通过可理解的行为或原始历史选择——这对他们如何看待皈依产生影响。