Lewisian theism is the view that both traditional theism and Lewis’s modal realism are true. On Lewisian theism, God must exist in worlds in one of the following ways: (1) God can be said to have a counterpart in each world; (2) God can be said to exist in each world in the way that a universal can be said to exist in worlds (if universals exist), i.e. through transworld identity; (3) God can be said to be a scattered individual, with a part of God existing in each world; and, (4) God can be said to exist in each world, through His existing from the standpoint of each world. In the literature, (1)–(4) have been rejected as viable options. I grant that (1) and (3) are not viable. However, I believe that (2) and (4) have been too hastily rejected. Herein, I develop ways to respond to objections to (2) and (4), and conclude that (4) is a viable option for Lewisian theists.

中文翻译：

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上帝在世界上的位置

刘易斯有神论认为传统有神论和刘易斯的模态实在论都是正确的。在刘易斯有神论中，上帝必须以下列方式之一存在于世界中：（1）可以说上帝在每个世界中都有一个对应物；(2) 可以说上帝存在于每个世界中，就像普遍存在于世界中一样（如果普遍存在），即通过跨世界同一性；(3) 神可以说是一个分散的个体，每个世界都存在着神的一部分；并且， (4) 可以说上帝存在于每个世界中，通过他从每个世界的角度存在。在文献中，（1）-（4）已被拒绝作为可行的选择。我承认（1）和（3）是不可行的。但是，我认为（2）和（4）被过于仓促地拒绝了。在此，我制定了回应对（2）和（4）的反对意见的方法，