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After Ratification: Predicting State Compliance with icc Treaty Obligations
International Criminal Law Review Pub Date : 2019-08-31 , DOI: 10.1163/15718123-01904002
Marco Bocchese 1
Affiliation  

Following the South African executive’s failure to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in June 2015, the issue of state noncompliance with politically-costly legal obligations has come to the fore yet again. Scholars of international law and politics leave crucial research questions unanswered: Why do states ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)? And, more importantly, how likely are their governments to genuinely comply with ICC norms and rulings when requested? This paper employs an original methodology to explore the aforementioned questions, combining a survey of the diplomats posted to the UN Headquarters in NYC with thirty-seven structured interviews. The study results show that state reasons for ratification strongly correlate with the expectation that state authorities will eventually comply with ICC treaty obligations. Put otherwise, diplomats see the (in)sincerity of state commitment to the Rome Statute of the ICC, and to international criminal law (ICL) more broadly, as a reliable predictor of future state compliance with the legal obligations envisaged therein. Three major conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, it stresses the importance of distinguishing between the moment of ratification and that of actual obligation. This analytical distinction, alongside the supporting empirical evidence, severely challenges the scholarly understanding that treaty ratification is itself a useful proxy for state compliance. Second, it problematizes the lawyerly assumption that state motives do not matter. All in all, that the ratification of the Rome Statute carries the same legal obligations for all state parties is not tantamount to say that all state parties are equally willing to meet those obligations. Third, it debunks the theoretical premise unpinning the African Union (AU)’s rhetoric on the ICC’s alleged neocolonial agenda.

中文翻译:

批准后:预测国家遵守国际商会条约义务的情况

继南非行政当局于 2015 年 6 月未能逮捕苏丹总统奥马尔·巴希尔之后,国家不遵守政治成本高昂的法律义务的问题再次浮出水面。国际法和政治学者没有回答关键的研究问题:为什么各国要批准《国际刑事法院罗马规约》(ICC)?而且,更重要的是,他们的政府在被要求时真正遵守 ICC 规范和裁决的可能性有多大?本文采用原创方法来探讨上述问题,结合对派驻纽约联合国总部的外交官的调查和 37 次结构化访谈。研究结果表明,国家批准的理由与国家当局最终遵守国际商会条约义务的期望密切相关。换句话说,外交官将国家对《国际刑事法院罗马规约》和更广泛的国际刑法 (ICL) 承诺的(不)诚意视为未来国家遵守其中设想的法律义务的可靠预测指标。从这项研究中可以得出三个主要结论。首先,它强调区分批准时间和实际义务时间的重要性。这种分析上的区别,连同支持的经验证据,严重挑战了学术上的理解,即条约批准本身就是国家遵守的有用代表。第二,它质疑了律师认为国家动机无关紧要的假设。总而言之,批准《罗马规约》对所有缔约国承担相同的法律义务,并不等于说所有缔约国都同样愿意履行这些义务。第三,它揭穿了将非洲联盟(AU)的言论与国际刑事法院所谓的新殖民议程无关的理论前提。
更新日期:2019-08-31
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