当前位置: X-MOL 学术Analysis › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Replies to Edgington, Pavese, and Campbell-Moore and Konek
Analysis Pub Date : 2020-04-01 , DOI: 10.1093/analys/anaa004
Sarah Moss

Even dogs have probabilistic beliefs. At dinnertime, Fido sits near the children, not the adults, because he believes that the children are more likely to drop food onto the floor. Edgington worries that this fact makes trouble for my complex content account of probabilistic belief. As she puts it, believing a probabilistic content appears to require more “self-consciousness and conceptual apparatus” than believing a proposition, and Fido “doesn’t have the concept of probability” that seems required to believe a probabilistic content. However, Edgington is mistaken to think that you must have a concept of probability in order to believe probabilistic contents. When it comes to concept possession, the complex content account is no more demanding than traditional accounts of belief. You do not need to grasp the concept of a possible world in order to believe the traditional content represented by the set of worlds where Jones smokes. For just the same reason, you do not need to grasp probability concepts in order to believe the

中文翻译:

对 Edgington、Pavese、Campbell-Moore 和 Konek 的回复

甚至狗也有概率信念。晚餐时间,Fido 坐在孩子身边,而不是大人,因为他认为孩子们更容易把食物掉到地板上。Edgington 担心这个事实会给我关于概率信念的复杂内容解释带来麻烦。正如她所说,相信概率内容似乎比相信命题需要更多的“自我意识和概念装置”,而菲多“没有概率的概念”,这似乎是相信概率内容所需的。然而,Edgington 错误地认为你必须有一个概率的概念才能相信概率内容。在概念占有方面,复杂的内容帐户并不比传统的信仰帐户要求更高。你不需要掌握可能世界的概念,就可以相信琼斯抽烟的世界集所代表的传统内容。出于同样的原因,您不需要掌握概率概念来相信
更新日期:2020-04-01
down
wechat
bug