A wealth of cases—most notably blindsight and priming under inattention or suppression—have convinced philosophers and scientists alike that perception occurs outside awareness. In recent work (Phillips 2016a, 2018, Block and Phillips 2016, and Peters et al. 2017), I dispute this consensus, arguing that any putative case of unconscious perception faces a dilemma. The dilemma divides over how absence of awareness is established. If subjective reports are used, we face the problem of the criterion: the concern that such reports underestimate conscious experience (Eriksen 1960, Holender 1986, Peters and Lau 2015). If objective measures are used, we face the problem of attribution: the concern that the case does not involve genuine individuallevel perception. Quilty-Dunn (forthcoming-a, this journal) presents an apparently compelling example of unconscious perception due to Mitroff, Scholl and Wynn (2005) which, he contends, evades this dilemma. The case is fascinating. However, as I here argue, it does not escape the dilemma’s clutches.

中文翻译：

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对象文件和无意识感知：对奎尔蒂-邓恩的回复

大量案例——最显着的是盲视和疏忽或压抑下的启动——使哲学家和科学家都相信感知发生在意识之外。在最近的工作中（Phillips 2016a, 2018, Block and Phillips 2016, and Peters et al. 2017），我对这一共识提出异议，认为任何假定的无意识感知案例都面临两难境地。困境在如何建立缺乏意识方面存在分歧。如果使用主观报告，我们将面临标准问题：担心此类报告低估了有意识的体验（Eriksen 1960，Holender 1986，Peters 和 Lau 2015）。如果使用客观衡量标准，我们将面临归因问题：担心案件不涉及真正的个人层面的感知。Quilty-D​​unn (即将推出-a, 该杂志）提供了一个明显令人信服的无意识感知示例，这是由于 Mitroff、Scholl 和 Wynn（2005 年）提出的，他认为这避免了这种困境。案情引人入胜。然而，正如我在这里所说的，它并没有摆脱困境的魔掌。