Kurt Gödel’s version of the Ontological Proof derives rather than assumes the crucial (yet controversial) Possibility Claim, that is, the claim that it is possible that somethingGod-like exists. Gödel’s derivation starts oš with a proof of the Possible Instantiation of the Positive, that is, the principle that, if a property is positive, it is possible that there exists something that has that property. I argue that Gödel’s proof of this principle relies on some implausible axiological assumptions. Nevertheless, I present a proof of the Possible Instantiation of the Positive which only relies on plausible axiological principles. Nonetheless, Gödel’s derivation of the Possibility Claim also needs a substantial axiological assumption, which is still open to doubt.

中文翻译：

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哥德尔本体论证明的可能性部分的补丁

库尔特·哥德尔版本的本体论证明推导出而不是假设关键的（但有争议的）可能性主张，即类似上帝的东西可能存在的主张。哥德尔的推导开始于?? 用 Positive 的可能实例化的证明，也就是说，如果一个属性是正的，则可能存在具有该属性的东西的原则。我认为哥德尔对这一原则的证明依赖于一些难以置信的价值论假设。尽管如此，我还是提出了一个证明可能实例化的实证，它仅依赖于合理的价值论原则。尽管如此，哥德尔对可能性主张的推导也需要一个实质性的价值论假设，这仍然值得怀疑。