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How Corporate Governance Mechanisms of Banks Have Changed After the 2007–08 Financial Crisis
Global Policy ( IF 2.375 ) Pub Date : 2020-01-01 , DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.12748
José L. Fernández Sánchez 1 , María D. Odriozola Zamanillo 1 , Manuel Luna 1
Affiliation  

Weak and ineffective corporate governance mechanisms in banks have been pointed out as the main factor that contributed to the 2007–08 financial crisis. The purpose of this study is to analyze empirically how the global financial crisis of 2007–08 has impacted on banks’ governance mechanisms, comparing the differences between the two most important models of corporate governance (the shareholder and stakeholder models), and if these changes are related to improvements in banks’ governance effectiveness. To carry out our analysis, we have used a sample with 46 of the largest commercial banks in the world and the period of analysis has covered from 2002 until 2015. Our findings show that Anglo-American banks following the common law system (shareholder model) maintained their high level of governance effectiveness after the financial crises. On the other hand, Continental European banks following the civil law system (stakeholder model) increased their effectiveness after the crisis changing some practices in their corporate governance mechanisms (improvements in the structure and functioning of directors’ boards, improvements in the compensation policy for banks’ executives, as well as the implementation of CSR committees) what led to a convergence of both governance systems. Policy Implications • Strong governance practices are essential to have effective bank systems that is critical to achieve and maintain a higher level of public confidence in the banking system. • The 2007–08 financial crisis has meant a convergence of governance practices between the common and civil law systems of corporate governance. • The convergence between both systems can be explained mainly by the improvement in the governance mechanisms of Continental European banks, increasing their level of governance effectiveness. • The implementation of CSR or sustainability committees in the banking sector has improved banks’ accountability and transparency. • Changes in the compensation policy for banks’ executives after the financial crisis have improved the banks’ governance effectiveness regardless the governance system. The global financial and banking crisis of 2007–08 has revealed the importance of enhancing understanding of bank governance (Gebba, 2015). Weak and ineffective corporate governance mechanisms in the banking sector can affect banks’ performance and economy as a whole (Zakaria et al., 2018) so that they were pointed out as the main factors that contributed to this crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Marcinkowska, 2012). Thus, banks’ boards were blamed for what appear to be excessive pay packages that their executives received even while their firms were failing or being bailed out by the government (Adams, 2012). Hence, the implementation of strong governance practices in the sector is essential to have effective bank systems what is critical to achieve and maintain a higher level of public confidence in the banking system (BCBS, 2006; Burlaka, 2006; Gebba, 2015; Levine, 2002; Zakaria et al., 2018). While specific features of banks and their influence on the corporate governance have raised the interest of some researchers (Laeven, 2013; Levine, 2004; Macey and O’Hara, 2003), there are relatively few cross-national studies about the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in the banking sector (Maxfield et al., 2018). In this way, Levine (2002) stresses the importance of broad cross-country analyses to carry out a stronger research on financial systems. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to analyze empirically how the global financial crisis of 2007–08 has impacted on banks’ governance mechanisms, comparing the differences between the two most important models of corporate governance (the shareholder and stakeholder models), and if these changes are related to improvements in banks’ governance effectiveness. To carry out this research, we have employed a dataset with 46 of the largest commercial banks © 2020 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2020) 11:Suppl.1 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12748 Global Policy Volume 11 . Supplement 1 . January 2020 52

中文翻译:

2007-08年金融危机后银行公司治理机制如何变化

银行薄弱且无效的公司治理机制被指出是导致 2007-08 年金融危机的主要因素。本研究的目的是实证分析 2007-08 年全球金融危机如何影响银行治理机制,比较两种最重要的公司治理模型(股东和利益相关者模型)之间的差异,以及这些变化是否与银行治理有效性的提高有关。为了进行我们的分析,我们使用了世界上 46 家最大的商业银行的样本,分析时间涵盖了 2002 年至 2015 年。我们的调查结果表明,英美银行遵循普通法制度(股东模式)在金融危机后保持高水平的治理有效性。另一方面,遵循大陆法系(利益相关者模式)的欧洲大陆银行在危机后提高了效率,改变了公司治理机制的一些做法(董事会结构和职能的改进,银行薪酬政策的改进) ' 高管,以及企业社会责任委员会的实施)导致两种治理体系融合的原因。政策含义 • 强有力的治理实践对于建立有效的银行系统至关重要,而这对于实现和保持公众对银行系统更高水平的信心至关重要。• 2007-08 年的金融危机意味着普通法和大陆法系公司治理之间的治理实践趋同。• 两个体系之间的趋同主要是由于欧洲大陆银行治理机制的改进,提高了它们的治理有效性水平。• 银行业企业社会责任或可持续发展委员会的实施提高了银行的问责制和透明度。• 金融危机后银行高管薪酬政策的变化,无论治理体系如何,都提高了银行的治理有效性。2007-08 年的全球金融和银行危机揭示了加强对银行治理的理解的重要性(Gebba,2015)。银行业薄弱和无效的公司治理机制会影响银行的整体业绩和经济(Zakaria 等,2018),因此他们被指出是导致这场危机的主要因素(Kirkpatrick,2009;Marcinkowska,2012)。因此,即使在公司倒闭或被政府救助的情况下,银行的董事会也因其高管收到的看似过高的薪酬而受到指责(亚当斯,2012 年)。因此,在该部门实施强有力的治理实践对于拥有有效的银行系统至关重要,而这对于实现和保持公众对银行系统更高水平的信心至关重要(BCBS,2006;Burlaka,2006;Gebba,2015;Levine, 2002 年;Zakaria 等人,2018 年)。虽然银行的具体特征及其对公司治理的影响引起了一些研究人员的兴趣(Laeven,2013;Levine,2004;Macey 和 O'Hara,2003),关于银行业公司治理机制有效性的跨国研究相对较少(Maxfield 等,2018)。通过这种方式,Levine (2002) 强调了广泛的跨国分析对于对金融系统进行更有力的研究的重要性。因此,本研究的目的是实证分析 2007-08 年全球金融危机如何影响银行治理机制,比较两种最重要的公司治理模型(股东和利益相关者模型)之间的差异,以及这些变化与银行治理有效性的提高有关。为了开展这项研究,我们使用了 46 家最大的商业银行的数据集 © 2020 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2020) 11:Suppl.1 doi: 10。1111/1758-5899.12748 全球政策第 11 卷。补充1。2020 年 1 月 52
更新日期:2020-01-01
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