This article adopts a diachronic view to compare patterns of institutional evolution of cooperation between the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) and the World Bank (or Bank) before and after the global financial crisis. While the rules for Fund-Bank cooperation had typically been tightened in response to crisis episodes, on balance they were loosened in the wake of the global financial crisis. Building on over 90 semi-structured expert interviews and relevant official documentation, I argue that this new trend was grounded in changed imaginaries of cooperation among IMF and World Bank officials. Whereas they had tended to envisage integrative futures in key areas of operational overlap before the crisis, alternative visions of more fragmented joint futures came to prevail after it. This difference manifested itself in a profound shift in official discourses about, as well as interviewee accounts of, the function of the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The analysis foregrounds the reflexivity of relationships between international organisations (IOs), especially the ability of IO staff involved in cooperative activities to (re)construct imaginaries that can foster or foreclose inter-organisational change. Policy Implications • Relationships between IOs are reflexive in the sense that what officials think about inter-organisational cooperation shapes how this cooperation works. Successful cooperation therefore requires IOs to pay attention not only to ‘hard’ input factors (such as material resources) but also to ‘soft’ ones (such as shared imaginaries of an inter-organisational relationship). • Since the global financial crisis, the relationship between the IMF and the World Bank has become institutionally looser and more selective. As the anticipated future tasks of the organisations gradually diverge, new cooperative relationships with other actors, including the Financial Stability Board (FSB) for the Fund and the United Nations (UN) for the Bank, will need to be built or deepened. • At least in the case of Fund-Bank cooperation, staff members enjoy considerable influence on matters of institutional design. Unless member states develop greater knowledge of processes of inter-organisational cooperation, they will be unable to effectively monitor how staff teams cooperate on a day-to-day basis. • To understand how institutional fragmentation can complicate global governance, policymakers and analysts alike should pay more attention to relationships between IOs. Inter-organisational fragmentation can have knock-on effects on other institutional elements of global governance architectures, such as international regimes or norms. At first glance, the history of cooperation between the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) and the World Bank (or Bank) is a showpiece of how crises spur institutional consolidation, as argued or implied by a large body of literature (Helleiner, 2010; Henning, 2013, p. 173; Saurugger and Terpan, 2016; generally, Kingdon, 2011, ch. 8). Responses to economic crises often entailed a gradual tightening of frameworks for Fund-Bank cooperation, which culminated in the launch of two prominent joint undertakings in the 1990s: the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP); and the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, which was later ‘enhanced’ through Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). In this respect, the 2007–08 global financial crisis marked an unexpected turning point: not only did the organisations refrain from instituting new joint programmes, but they also subsequently enacted reforms that loosened cooperation on both the FSAP and the PRSP. Why did the previous trend of institutionalising IMF-World Bank cooperation reverse after the crisis? To address this empirical puzzle, the present article uses insights from 97 semi-structured interviews conducted by the author in 2015–19 with IMF and World Bank Group officials, government officials and civil society actors. The wealth of the interview material, complemented by documentary evidence, corroborates constructivist insights in International Relations and sociology into how ‘problematisation’ can beget (de)institutionalisation (H€ ulsse, 2007; Maguire and Hardy, 2009), as well as how collective imaginaries can ‘perform’ certain presents (Berenskoetter, 2011; Mische, 2009). Connecting these two strands, I argue that how staff members involved in the day-to-day practices of Fund-Bank cooperation imagined the organisations’ future relationship altered the possibilities for their present relationship. When prompted to envisage the future of IMF-World Bank Global Policy (2020) 11:1 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12743 © 2019 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made. Global Policy Volume 11 . Issue 1 . February 2020 15

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国际货币基金组织-世界银行在全球金融危机前后的合作

本文采用历时的观点来比较全球金融危机前后国际货币基金组织（IMF）与世界银行（或世行）合作的制度演进模式。虽然基金与银行合作的规则通常是为应对危机事件而收紧，但总的来说，它们在全球金融危机之后有所放松。基于 90 多份半结构化专家访谈和相关官方文件，我认为这种新趋势的基础是国际货币基金组织和世界银行官员之间合作的想象发生了变化。危机前，他们倾向于在业务重叠的关键领域设想一体化未来，但在危机之后，更分散的联合未来的替代愿景开始盛行。这种差异体现在官方关于金融部门评估计划 (FSAP) 和减贫战略文件 (PRSP) 功能的讨论以及受访者描述的深刻转变中。该分析突出了国际组织 (IO) 之间关系的反思性，尤其是参与合作活动的 IO 工作人员（重新）构建可以促进或阻止组织间变革的想象的能力。政策含义 • IO 之间的关系是自反的，因为官员们对组织间合作的看法会影响这种合作的运作方式。因此，成功的合作要求 IO 不仅要注意“硬”输入因素（例如物质资源），还要注意“软”输入因素（例如组织间关系的共享想象）。• 自全球金融危机以来，IMF 与世界银行之间的关系在制度上变得更加松散且更具选择性。随着各组织预期的未来任务逐渐出现分歧，需要建立或深化与其他参与者的新合作关系，包括基金的金融稳定委员会 (FSB) 和银行的联合国 (UN)。• 至少在基金-银行合作的情况下，工作人员对制度设计问题具有相当大的影响。除非成员国对组织间合作的过程有更多的了解，他们将无法有效监测工作人员团队的日常合作情况。• 要了解制度碎片化如何使全球治理复杂化，政策制定者和分析师都应该更加关注 IO 之间的关系。组织间的分裂可能会对全球治理架构的其他制度要素（例如国际制度或规范）产生连锁反应。乍一看，正如大量文献所论证或暗示的那样，国际货币基金组织（IMF 或基金组织）与世界银行（或银行）之间的合作历史是危机如何刺激制度整合的典范（Helleiner，2010 年） ；Henning，2013 年，第 173 页；Saurugger 和 Terpan，2016 年；一般而言，Kingdon，2011 年，第 8 章）。应对经济危机往往需要逐步收紧基金与银行的合作框架，最终在 1990 年代启动了两项重要的联合项目：金融部门评估计划（FSAP）；重债穷国（HIPC）倡议，后来通过减贫战略文件（PRSP）得到“加强”。在这方面，2007-08 年全球金融危机标志着一个意想不到的转折点：这些组织不仅没有制定新的联合计划，而且随后还实施了改革，放松了 FSAP 和 PRSP 的合作。为何以往IMF与世界银行合作制度化的趋势在危机后逆转？为了解决这个经验难题，本文使用了作者在 2015-19 年与国际货币基金组织和世界银行集团官员、政府官员和民间社会行为者进行的 97 次半结构化访谈的见解。丰富的访谈材料，辅以书面证据，证实了国际关系和社会学中的建构主义洞察力，即“问题化”如何导致（去）制度化（H€ulsse，2007 年；Maguire 和 Hardy，2009 年），以及如何集体化想象可以“表演”某些礼物（Berenskoetter，2011；Mische，2009）。将这两股联系起来，我认为参与基金-银行合作日常实践的工作人员如何想象组织的未来关系改变了他们目前关系的可能性。当被提示设想国际货币基金组织-世界银行全球政策（2020 年）的未来时，11:1 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12743 © 2019 作者。杜伦大学和约翰威利父子公司发布的全球政策。这是一篇根据知识共享署名-非商业性-禁止衍生许可条款的开放获取文章，允许在任何媒体中使用和分发，前提是原始作品被正确引用，使用是非商业性的，并且没有进行任何修改或改编。全球政策第 11 卷。问题 1。2020 年 2 月 15 如果正确引用了原始作品，则该使用是非商业性的，并且不进行任何修改或改编。全球政策第 11 卷。问题 1。2020 年 2 月 15 如果正确引用了原始作品，则该使用是非商业性的，并且不进行任何修改或改编。全球政策第 11 卷。问题 1。2020 年 2 月 15