While the International Debt Crisis of the early 1980s was the most severe financial crisis since World War II and while national and international banking supervision was developing at that time, little is known about the response of supervisors to the deteriorating financial environment in the years preceding the crisis. Complementing the political and business history of the international debt situation, this article aims to unravel the international banking supervision side of the question. Based on archival material from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and various central banks, the article examines how the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), then emerging as the leading forum on international banking supervision, anticipated the International Debt Crisis through the prism of ‘country risk’. The article shows that the Committee refused to recommend strict regulations in this area. It argues that members adopted this position because of the lack of good information and the difficult position of banking supervision between macroeconomic issues and individual banks’ own responsibilities, but also because of somewhat excessive faith in market mechanisms. Their discussions on country risk shed light on critical challenges of banking supervision and, thereby, on the history of banking regulation and prudential thinking.

中文翻译：

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监管者反对监管？国际债务危机前的巴塞尔委员会和国家风险（1976-1982）

虽然 1980 年代初的国际债务危机是二战以来最严重的金融危机，而且当时国内和国际银行监管正在发展，但对于监管机构对二战前几年不断恶化的金融环境的反应知之甚少。危机。本文补充了国际债务形势的政治和商业历史，旨在揭示问题的国际银行监管方面。基于来自国际清算银行 (BIS) 和各中央银行的档案材料，本文探讨了巴塞尔银行监管委员会 (BCBS) 如何通过“国家风险”的棱镜。文章表明，委员会拒绝在这方面提出严格的规定。它认为，委员们之所以采取这一立场，是因为缺乏良好的信息以及银行监管在宏观经济问题和个别银行自身责任之间的困难地位，也因为对市场机制的信心有些过分。他们关于国家风险的讨论揭示了银行业监管的重大挑战，从而揭示了银行业监管和审慎思维的历史。但也因为对市场机制有些过度的信任。他们关于国家风险的讨论揭示了银行业监管的重大挑战，从而揭示了银行业监管和审慎思维的历史。但也因为对市场机制有些过度的信任。他们关于国家风险的讨论揭示了银行业监管的重大挑战，从而揭示了银行业监管和审慎思维的历史。