This article traces the origin of too-big-to-fail policy in modern US banking to the bailout of the $1.2b Bank of the Commonwealth in 1972. It describes this bailout and those of subsequent banks through that of Continental Illinois in 1984. During this period, market concentration due to interstate banking restrictions is a factor in most of the bailouts and systemic risk concerns were raised to justify the bailouts of surprisingly small banks. Finally, most of the bailouts in this period relied on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's use of the Essentiality Doctrine and Federal Reserve lending. A discussion of this doctrine is used to illustrate how legal constraints on regulators may become less constraining over time.

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美国“大而不倒”政策的起源

本文追溯现代美国银行业“大而不倒”政策的起源，可追溯到 1972 年对 1.2b 美元的联邦银行的救助。它描述了这种救助以及随后的银行通过 1984 年伊利诺伊州大陆的救助。在此期间，由于州际银行限制导致的市场集中是大多数救助的一个因素，并且提出了系统性风险担忧，以证明对令人惊讶的小型银行的救助是合理的。最后，这一时期的大部分救助依赖于联邦存款保险公司对基本原则和美联储贷款的使用。对这一原则的讨论用于说明对监管机构的法律约束如何随着时间的推移而变得不那么约束。