The orthodox definition of hope suffers from an exclusion problem: it is unable to exclude subjects without hope. In fact, the orthodox definition even allows for despair to be falsely classified as hope. This problem suggests two basic desiderata for a successful analysis of hope: it should solve the exclusion problem, and it should have the resources to explain why, in a given situation, a subject does or does not form a hope. Bearing these desiderata in mind, I assess two recent hope-accounts offered by Jack M. C. Kwong and Cheshire Calhoun. I then offer my own view, which is based on the Jamesian notion of a “live possibility”. I suggest that a possibility needs to reach a certain probability threshold in order to count as live, and according to my account, to hope is to desire the truth of such a live possibility. This view is well-equipped to solve the exclusion problem, and it can explain why a subject does or does not hope.

中文翻译：

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分析希望：活生生的可能性帐户

希望的正统定义存在一个排斥问题：它无法排除没有希望的主体。事实上，正统的定义甚至允许将绝望错误地归类为希望。这个问题提出了成功分析希望的两个基本要求：它应该解决排斥问题，并且它应该有资源来解释为什么在给定的情况下，一个主题会形成或不形成希望。考虑到这些需求，我评估了 Jack MC Kwong 和 Cheshire Calhoun 最近提出的两个希望帐户。然后我提出我自己的观点，这是基于詹姆士的“生活可能性”概念。我建议一种可能性需要达到一定的概率阈值才能算作是活的，根据我的说法，希望就是渴望这种活的可能性的真相。