For Julia Driver, some virtues involve ignorance. Modesty, for example, is a disposition to underestimate self-worth, and blind charity is a disposition not to see others’ defects. Such “virtues of ignorance,” she argues, serve as counterexamples to the Aristotelian view that virtue requires intellectual excellence. But Driver seems to face a dilemma: if virtues of ignorance involve ignorance of valuable knowledge, then they do not merit virtue status; but if they involve ignorance of trivial knowledge, then they do not preclude intellectual excellence. So, either there are no virtues of ignorance, or there are no virtues of ignorance – at least not the sort of ignorance that precludes intellectual excellence. Virtues of ignorance therefore fail as counterexamples to Aristotelian virtue theory.

中文翻译：

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司机无知美德的困境

对于 Julia Driver 来说，一些美德与无知有关。例如，谦虚是一种低估自我价值的性格，盲目慈善是一种不看别人缺点的性格。她认为，这种“无知的美德”与亚里士多德的美德需要智力卓越的观点相反。但司机似乎面临着一个两难境地：如果无知的美德涉及对宝贵知识的无知，那么它们就没有美德地位；但如果它们涉及对琐碎知识的无知，那么它们并不排除智力卓越。所以，要么没有无知的美德，要么没有无知的美德——至少不是那种排除智力卓越的无知。因此，无知的美德不能作为亚里士多德美德理论的反例。