Jeremy Williams has argued that if we are committed to a liberal pro-choice stance with regard to selective abortion for disability, we will be unable to justify the prohibition of sex selective abortion. Here, I apply his reasoning to selective abortion based on other traits pregnant women may decide are undesirable. These include susceptibility to disease, level of intelligence, physical appearance, sexual orientation, religious belief and criminality—in fact any traits attributable to some degree to a genetic component. Firstly, I review Williams’ argument, which claims that if a woman is granted the right to abort based on fetal impairment, then by parity of reasoning she should also be granted the right to choose sex selective abortion. I show that these same considerations that entail the permissibility of sex selective abortion are also applicable to genetic selection abortion. I then examine the objections to sex selective abortion that Williams considers and rejects, and show that they also lack force against genetic selection abortion. Finally, I consider some additional objections that might be raised, and conclude that a liberal pro-choice stance on selective abortion for disability entails the permissibility of selective abortion for most genetic traits.

中文翻译：

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基因选择性堕胎：仍然是一个选择问题

杰里米·威廉姆斯 (Jeremy Williams) 辩称，如果我们致力于针对残疾选择性堕胎采取自由主义的支持选择立场，我们将无法证明禁止性别选择性堕胎是正当的。在这里，我将他的推理应用于基于孕妇可能认为不受欢迎的其他特征的选择性流产。这些包括对疾病的易感性、智力水平、外貌、性取向、宗教信仰和犯罪行为——事实上，任何在某种程度上可归因于遗传成分的特征。首先，我回顾了威廉姆斯的论点，该论点声称，如果女性因胎儿受损而被授予堕胎权，那么根据同等推理，她也应该被授予选择性别选择性堕胎的权利。我表明，这些涉及允许性别选择性堕胎的相同考虑也适用于基因选择堕胎。然后我检查了威廉姆斯考虑并拒绝的对性别选择性堕胎的反对意见，并表明他们也缺乏反对基因选择堕胎的力量。最后，我考虑了可能会提出的一些其他反对意见，并得出结论，对残疾选择性堕胎的自由主义支持选择立场意味着大多数遗传特征的选择性堕胎是允许的。