Barry Maguire has recently argued that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes like fear and admiration differs fundamentally from that of reasons. These arguments appear to raise new and serious challenges for the popular ‘reasons-first’ view according to which normative support of any kind comes from reasons. In this paper, I show how proponents of the reasons-first view can meet these challenges. They can do so, I argue, if they can successfully meet some other well-known challenges to their view: distinguishing between right and wrong kinds of reasons, distinguishing between reasons, enablers, and defeaters, and providing an account of the relation between reasons and rationality. Whether proponents of the reasons-first view can meet these other challenges remains controversial. I do not try to settle these questions here, but rather show that the debate about the nature of normative support for affective attitudes is not going to be settled in isolation from them.

中文翻译：

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情感态度如何可能存在原因

巴里·马奎尔（Barry Maguire）最近认为，对恐惧和钦佩等情感态度的规范支持的性质与理由的性质根本不同。这些论点似乎对流行的“理由至上”的观点提出了新的严峻挑战，即任何形式的规范支持都来自理由。在本文中，我展示了原因优先观点的支持者如何应对这些挑战。我认为，如果他们能够成功应对其他一些对他们的观点的众所周知的挑战，他们就可以这样做：区分正确和错误的理由，区分理由、促成因素和失败者，并说明理由之间的关系和理性。原因优先观点的支持者是否能够应对这些其他挑战仍然存在争议。我不试图在这里解决这些问题，