The philosophical literature on well-being and the good life contains very little explicit discussion of what makes for a better or worse death. The purpose of this essay is to highlight some commonly held views about the good death and investigate whether these views are recognized by the leading theories of well-being. While the most widely discussed theories do have implications about what constitutes a good death, they seem unable to fully accommodate these popular good death views. I offer two partial explanations for why these views have been neglected in discussions of well-being and make two corresponding recommendations for future work in the philosophy of well-being.

中文翻译：

---

幸福和美好的死亡

关于幸福和美好生活的哲学文献很少明确讨论是什么导致更好或更糟的死亡。本文的目的是突出一些普遍持有的关于善死的观点，并调查这些观点是否被主流幸福理论所认可。虽然讨论最广泛的理论确实对什么是好死有影响，但它们似乎无法完全适应这些流行的好死观点。我对为什么这些观点在福祉的讨论中被忽视提供了两个部分解释，并为福祉哲学的未来工作提出了两个相应的建议。