Several authors believe that metaethicists ought to leave their comfortable armchairs and engage with serious empirical research. This paper provides partial support for the opposing view, that metaethics is rightly conducted from the armchair. It does so by focusing on debunking arguments against robust moral realism. Specifically, the article discusses arguments based on the possibility that if robust realism is correct, then our beliefs are most likely insensitive to the relevant truths. These arguments seem at first glance to be dependent on empirical research to learn what our moral beliefs are sensitive to. It is argued, however, that this is not so. The paper then examines two thought experiments that have been thought to demonstrate that debunking arguments might depend on empirical details and argues that the conclusion is not supported.

中文翻译：

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无需从扶手椅上站起来（如果您对揭穿元伦理学中的论点感兴趣）

几位作者认为元伦理学家应该离开他们舒适的扶手椅并从事严肃的实证研究。本文为相反的观点提供了部分支持，即元伦理学是在扶手椅上正确进行的。它通过专注于揭穿反对强大的道德现实主义的论点来做到这一点。具体而言，本文讨论的论点基于这样一种可能性：如果稳健现实主义是正确的，那么我们的信念很可能对相关真理不敏感。乍一看，这些论点似乎依赖于实证研究来了解我们的道德信念对什么敏感。然而，有人认为事实并非如此。然后，该论文检查了两个思想实验，这些实验被认为证明揭穿论点可能取决于经验细节，并认为该结论不受支持。