:The standard, Bayesian account of rational belief and decision is often argued to be unable to cope properly with severe uncertainty, of the sort ubiquitous in some areas of policy making. This paper tackles the question of what should replace it as a guide for rational decision making. It defends a recent proposal, which reserves a role for the decision maker’s confidence in beliefs. Beyond being able to cope with severe uncertainty, the account has strong normative credentials on the main fronts typically evoked as relevant for rational belief and decision. It fares particularly well, we argue, in comparison to other prominent non-Bayesian models in the literature.

中文翻译：

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对信念和理性决策的信心

: 理性信念和决策的标准贝叶斯解释经常被认为无法正确应对严重的不确定性，这种不确定性在某些政策制定领域无处不在。本文解决了应该用什么代替它作为理性决策指南的问题。它为最近的一项提议辩护，该提议保留了决策者对信念的信心的作用。除了能够应对严重的不确定性之外，该帐户在主要方面具有强大的规范性凭证，通常被认为与理性信念和决策相关。我们认为，与文献中其他著名的非贝叶斯模型相比，它的表现特别好。