Investigations into Central Europe’s emerging party–state relationships—in contrast to those of the former Soviet Union—have focused less on the abuse of public office for private gain and more on patronage and clientelism as political resources. That debate in turn has been bounded by the conventional political science preoccupation with civil society, party, and state relations. This article contends that these conventions have tended to deflect our attention from the contemporary dynamics of political corruption in Central Europe, in which the commercial sector is a major player and the gains of political players primarily private. Building on the assumption that party systemic adaptations are contingent on changing power relations within the political economy, this article offers an ideal typical party model to characterise the behaviour of political parties that preside over the continuous marketization of the state. A “corporate brokerage party” directs its strategic focus to the private sector and acts primarily as a broker of the state’s power in the marketplace, whether expressed through privatisation, regulation, or public procurement. Using the Czech Republic as a critical case study for Central Europe, the evidence suggests that politicians able to direct allocation to the private sector with low regulatory constraints act less evidently as technocratic brokers of the public interest, partisan constituency, or organisation builders and more as private agents.

中文翻译：

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开放社会中的公司状态捕获

与前苏联相比，对中欧新兴政党与国家关系的调查较少集中在滥用公职谋取私利上，而更多地集中在作为政治资源的赞助和客户关系上。反过来，这种辩论又受到了传统政治学对公民社会，政党和国家关系的关注。本文认为，这些公约倾向于将我们的注意力从中欧的政治腐败的当代动态中转移出来，在中欧，商业部门是主要参与者，而政治参与者的收益则主要是私人的。假设政党的系统适应取决于政治经济中权力关系的变化，本文提供了一个理想的典型政党模型来描述主持国家持续市场化的政党的行为。“公司经纪人党”将其战略重点放在私营部门上，并且主要充当国家在市场上的权力的经纪人，无论是通过私有化，监管还是公共采购来表达。以捷克共和国为中欧的一个关键案例研究，证据表明，能够将监管直接转移到具有低监管约束的私营部门的政治家作为公共利益，党派选民或组织建设者的技术官僚行事的表现不那么明显，而更多的是私人代理商。“公司经纪人党”将其战略重点放在私营部门上，并且主要充当国家在市场上的权力的经纪人，无论是通过私有化，监管还是公共采购来表达。以捷克共和国为中欧的一个关键案例研究，证据表明，能够将监管直接转移到具有低监管约束的私营部门的政治家作为公共利益，党派选民或组织建设者的技术官僚行事的表现不那么明显，而更多的是私人代理商。“公司经纪人党”将其战略重点放在私营部门上，并且主要充当国家在市场上的权力的经纪人，无论是通过私有化，监管还是公共采购来表达。以捷克共和国为中欧的一个关键案例研究，证据表明，能够将监管直接转移到具有低监管约束的私营部门的政治家作为公共利益，党派选民或组织建设者的技术官僚行事的表现不那么明显，而更多的是私人代理商。