In her excellent monograph, Margherita Arcangeli offers a defense of supposition as a sui generis kind of imagination. Endorsing a simulationist account of imagination according to which every imaginative attitude simulates/re‐creates a genuine counterpart (visualizing re‐creates visual perception, for instance), she argues against this backdrop that supposition is a re‐creative state of acceptance. Arcangeli's inquiry concentrates on the most recent literature. She starts by critically examining certain putative features of supposition that place them outside of the realm of imagination (Part I. §1. Phenomenology, §2. Emotionality, §3. Participation). She then explores the positive features of supposition (Part I. §4. Features proper to supposition) and, then, the deflationists' attempts to define supposition in terms of non‐imaginative (Part II. §5. Supposition as non‐imaginative) or imaginative (Part II. §6. Supposition as imaginative) mental states. Through technical and yet crystal‐clear prose, Arcangeli provides what is, in my opinion, the best defense of the imaginative account of supposition to date.

中文翻译：

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MargheritaArcangeli，假设和想象领域。A Philosophical Inquiry，Routledge：纽约，2018 年，148 页，150 美元（精装本），ISBN：978-1138223042

在她出色的专着中，Margherita Arcangeli 为假设是一种自成一格的想象提供了辩护。她赞同模拟主义对想象的描述，根据这种描述，每一种想象态度都会模拟/再创造一个真正的对应物（例如，视觉化再创造视觉感知），她反对这种假设是一种再创造的接受状态的背景。Arcangeli 的调查集中在最近的文献上。她首先批判性地检查假设的某些假定特征，这些特征将它们置于想象的领域之外（第一部分。§1。现象学，§2。情感，§3。参与）。然后，她探讨了假设的积极特征（第一部分。§4. 适合假设的特征），然后是紧缩论者的 试图根据非想象（第二部分。§5。假设为非想象）或想象（第二部分。§6。假设为想象）的心理状态来定义假设。通过技术性而又清晰的散文，在我看来，Arcangeli 提供了迄今为止对假设的富有想象力的解释的最佳辩护。