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Emotional Experience and Propositional Content
Dialectica Pub Date : 2019-12-18 , DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12285
Jonathan Mitchell 1
Affiliation  

Those arguing for the existence of non-propositional content appeal to emotions for support, although there has been little engagement in those debates with developments in contemporary theory of emotion, specifically in connection with the kind of mental states that emotional experiences are. Relatedly, within emotion theory, one finds claims that emotional experiences per se have non-propositional content without detailed argument. This paper argues that the content of emotional experience is propositional in a weak sense, associated with aspectual experience and correctness conditions. Furthermore, it provides an interpretation of purely-objectual emotional experiences which satisfies this weak view of propositional content.

中文翻译:

情感体验与命题内容

那些主张存在非命题内容的人诉诸情感以获得支持,尽管在这些辩论中几乎没有参与当代情感理论的发展,特别是与情感体验的那种心理状态有关。相关地,在情感理论中,人们发现情感体验本身具有非命题内容而没有详细论证。本文认为,情感体验的内容是弱意义上的命题,与方面体验和正确性条件相关联。此外,它提供了对纯客观情感体验的解释,满足了这种对命题内容的弱看法。
更新日期:2019-12-18
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