Scholars such as Renaud Barbara and Bernhard Waldenfels and Regula Giuliani have emphasized time’s central role in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, and Michael Kelly has shown how the Phenomenology’s “Temporality” chapter already broaches his later ontological concerns. I deepen our understanding of this temporal–ontological nexus by showing how Merleau-Ponty’s temporal ontology in fact erupts even earlier in the Phenomenology, as an underlying theme that unifies part two, on “The Perceived World,” as leading into the “Temporality” chapter. I do this via a close study of the chapter, “The Thing and the Natural World,” first explicating some profound but easily overlooked points about time implied in Merleau-Ponty’s initial remarks on the constancy of form and size. I then closely analyze his study of color constancy in relation to his central source, David Katz’s The World of Colour, to show how color leads him to conceptualize things as what I call “time-things”—and more generally to conceptualize things, the world, and nature, as being in such a way that temporality is ingredient in their being. This leads to some implications for his temporal ontology.

中文翻译：

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从“块状事物”到“时间事物”：梅洛-庞蒂感知现象学第二部分的时间本体论

Renaud Barbara、Bernhard Waldenfels 和 Regula Giuliani 等学者都强调了时间在梅洛-庞蒂哲学中的核心作用，而迈克尔·凯利已经展示了现象学的“时间性”一章如何已经提出了他后来的本体论关注。我通过展示梅洛-庞蒂的时间本体论实际上是如何在《现象学》中更早地爆发来加深我们对这种时间-本体论联系的理解，作为统一第二部分的潜在主题，“感知世界”，作为引导到“时间性”章节。我通过仔细研究“事物与自然世界”一章来做到这一点，首先解释了梅洛-庞蒂关于形式和大小恒定性的初步评论中隐含的一些深刻但容易被忽视的时间点。然后我仔细分析了他对颜色恒常性的研究与他的中心来源的关系，David Katz 的 The World of Colour，展示色彩如何引导他将事物概念化为我所说的“时间-事物”——更一般地说，将事物、世界和自然概念化为时间性是其成分的方式他们的存在。这对他的时间本体论产生了一些影响。