A theory of the first-person plural occupies a unique place in philosophical investigations into intersubjectivity and social cognition. In order for the referent of the first-person plural—“the We”—to come into existence, it seems there must be a shared ground of communicative possibility, but this requires a non-circular explanation of how this ground could be shared in the absence of a pre-existing context of communicative conventions. Margaret Gilbert’s and John Searle’s theories of collective intentionality capture important aspects of the We, but fail to fully account for this shared ground of communicative possibility. This paper argues that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of intercorporeity helps reconcile the positive aspects of these accounts while also explaining how the genesis of the social world is continuous with perceptual life in general. This enables an account of the first-person plural as dependent on reciprocal communicative interaction (à la Gilbert) without the need to posit a primitive or primordial “we-mode” of consciousness (à la Searle). “Intercorporeity” designates a bodily openness to others that is not fundamentally different in kind from the general style of bodily comportment found in Merleau-Ponty’s rich analyses of perceptual life.

中文翻译：

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Merleau-Ponty 的 Intercorporeity 和第一人称复数

第一人称复数理论在主体间性和社会认知的哲学研究中占有独特的地位。为了使第一人称复数的所指——“我们”——出现，似乎必须有一个交流可能性的共享基础，但这需要一个非循环的解释，说明这个基础如何在缺乏预先存在的交流约定的背景。玛格丽特·吉尔伯特 (Margaret Gilbert) 和约翰·塞尔 (John Searle) 的集体意向性理论抓住了我们的重要方面，但未能充分说明这种交流可能性的共同基础。本文认为，梅洛-庞蒂的交互性概念有助于调和这些描述的积极方面，同时也解释了社会世界的起源如何与一般的知觉生活相连续。这使得第一人称复数依赖于相互交流互动（à la Gilbert）而无需假设意识的原始或原始“我们模式”（à la Searle）。“Intercorporeity”指的是对他人的身体开放，这与梅洛-庞蒂对知觉生活的丰富分析中发现的一般身体行为方式在种类上没有根本的不同。