What explains the context sensitivity of some (apparent) beliefs? Why, for example, do religious beliefs appear to control behaviour in some contexts but not others? Cases like this are heterogeneous, and we may require a matching heterogeneity of explanations, ranging over their contents, the attitudes of agents and features of the environment. In this paper, I put forward a hypothesis of the last kind. I argue that some beliefs (religious and non-religious) are coupled to cues, which either trigger an internal representation or even partially constitute the beliefs. I show that such coupling will give rise to the context-sensitivity, without entailing that religious believers take a different attitude to belief content.

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什么解释了某些（明显的）信念的上下文敏感性？例如，为什么宗教信仰似乎在某些情况下控制行为而不是其他情况？像这样的案例是异质的，我们可能需要一个匹配的异质性解释，涵盖其内容、代理人的态度和环境特征。在这篇论文中，我提出了最后一种假设。我认为某些信念（宗教的和非宗教的）与线索相关联，这些线索要么触发内部表征，要么部分构成信念。我表明这种耦合会引起上下文敏感性，而不会导致宗教信徒对信仰内容采取不同的态度。