当前位置: X-MOL 学术Contemporary Pragmatism › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
The Factual Belief Fallacy
Contemporary Pragmatism Pub Date : 2018-08-31 , DOI: 10.1163/18758185-01503004
Neil Van Leeuwen 1
Affiliation  

This paper explains a fallacy that often arises in theorizing about human minds. I call it the Factual Belief Fallacy. The Fallacy, roughly, involves drawing conclusions about human psychology that improperly ignore the large background of mostly accurate factual beliefs people have. The Factual Belief Fallacy has led to significant mistakes in both philosophy of mind and cognitive science of religion. Avoiding it helps us better see the difference between factual belief and religious credence; seeing that difference in turn enables us to pose interesting normative questions about various mental states labeled “belief.”

中文翻译:

事实信念谬误

这篇论文解释了在对人类思想进行理论化时经常出现的一个谬误。我称之为事实信念谬误。粗略地说,该谬论涉及得出关于人类心理学的结论,这些结论不当地忽略了人们拥有的大部分准确的事实信念的大背景。事实信仰谬误导致了心灵哲学和宗教认知科学的重大错误。避免它有助于我们更好地看到事实信仰和宗教信仰之间的区别;反过来,看到这种差异使我们能够对标记为“信念”的各种心理状态提出有趣的规范性问题。
更新日期:2018-08-31
down
wechat
bug