Many contextualist accounts in epistemology appeal to ordinary language and everyday practice as grounds for positing a low-standards knowledge (knowledge L ) that contrasts with high-standards prevalent in epistemology (knowledge H ). We compare these arguments to arguments from the height of “ordinary language” philosophy in the mid 20th century and find that all such arguments face great difficulties. We find a powerful argument for the legitimacy and necessity of knowledge L (but not of knowledge H ). These appeals to practice leave us with reasons to accept knowledge L in the face of radical doubts raised by skeptics. We conclude by arguing that by relegating knowledge H to isolated contexts, the contextualist fails to deal with the skeptical challenge head-on. Knowledge H and knowledge L represent competing, incompatible intuitions about knowledge, and we must choose between them. A fallibilist conception of knowledge, formed with proper attention to radical doubts, can address the skeptical challenge without illicit appeal to everyday usage.

中文翻译：

---

语境主义的普通语言案例和激进怀疑的相关性

认识论中的许多语境主义解释都将日常语言和日常实践作为假设低标准知识（知识 L ）与认识论中流行的高标准知识（知识 H ）形成对比的基础。我们将这些论点与 20 世纪中叶“普通语言”哲学高度的论点进行比较，发现所有这些论点都面临着巨大的困难。我们为知识 L（但不是知识 H）的合法性和必要性找到了有力的论据。这些对实践的诉求使我们有理由在怀疑论者提出的根本怀疑面前接受知识 L。我们得出结论认为，通过将知识 H 归入孤立的语境，语境主义者无法正面应对持怀疑态度的挑战。知识 H 和知识 L 代表竞争，关于知识的不相容直觉，我们必须在它们之间做出选择。在适当关注激进怀疑的情况下形成的易错论的知识概念可以解决怀疑的挑战，而不会非法吸引日常使用。