It has been empirically observed that reserving seats for leaders belonging to disadvantaged social groups at the local level improves targeting of household public goods to households belonging to these groups. However, it is not clear whether a similar result holds for the allocation of village public goods that have limited spillover effects across households in a village, such as repair and maintenance of access roads to households, streetlights, sewer lines, etc. The present paper uses locational data collected from a sample of Indian villages and applies spatial econometrics to test whether political reservations for elected representatives increase allocations to households belonging to the reserved community, especially when they are in the minority. The results show that for certain types of village public goods, political reservations produce favourable allocations for the reserved community when locational clustering of the communities is present.

中文翻译：

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社区层面的乡村公共产品配置：政治保留有用吗？

经验表明，在地方一级为属于弱势社会群体的领导人保留席位可以提高家庭公共产品对属于这些群体的家庭的针对性。然而，尚不清楚类似的结果是否适用于对村内家庭的溢出效应有限的村公共物品的分配，例如维修和保养通往家庭的道路、路灯、下水道等。 本文uses locational data collected from a sample of Indian villages and applies spatial econometrics to test whether political reservations for elected representatives increase allocations to households belonging to the reserved community, especially when they are in the minority. 结果表明，对于某些类型的乡村公共产品，