This paper examines Hayek's constitutional theory of the liberal state. Hayek argued powerfully that no central planner has sufficient knowledge to run an economy, and that no one has sufficient knowledge to determine ends for others. Pushed to their logical conclusion, these arguments would seem to prescribe the smallest possible state in both scope and size, or perhaps even no state at all. Elsewhere in his writings, however, Hayek explicitly endorsed government activity that goes far beyond a “night watchman” state (to include public works such as infrastructure, roads and bridge, as well as social insurance, conscription, a minimum safety net, and even countercyclical investment)—as long as state action was carefully constrained by a generality principle. After thoroughly setting forth Hayek's worries about knowledge and his proposals for acceptable station action, the paper synthesizes the two into a Hayekian constitutional theory of the liberal state, then closes with a brief discussion of some tensions in Hayek's work.

中文翻译：

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一般性与知识：哈耶克的自由国家宪政理论

本文考察了哈耶克关于自由国家的宪政理论。哈耶克有力地指出，没有中央计划者有足够的知识来运行经济，也没有人有足够的知识来决定他人的目的。推到他们的逻辑结论，这些论点似乎在范围和大小上都规定了最小的可能状态，或者甚至根本没有状态。然而，哈耶克在其著作的其他地方明确支持政府活动远远超出“守夜人”状态（包括基础设施、道路和桥梁等公共工程，以及社会保险、征兵、最低安全网，甚至反周期投资）——只要国家行动受到普遍性原则的谨慎约束。在彻底阐述哈耶克之后