Rational ignorance and related models of voter choice have been accused of psychological implausibility or even incoherence. Although such models run counter to folk psychological understandings of choice, this paper argues that they are consistent with widely-accepted dual process theories of cognition. Specifically, I suggest that political ignorance can be explained via a “default-interventionist” account in which a biased intuitive subsystem produces automatic responses which are overridden by rational reflection when the prospective costs of error are significant. This is consistent with rational ignorance and related theories of political ignorance and bias. Providing stronger psychological foundations for rational ignorance also suggests new ways in which the theory might be developed to increase its predictive, analytic, and evaluative power.

中文翻译：

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理性无知的心理基础：有偏见的启发式和决策成本

理性的无知和选民选择的相关模型被指责为心理上的不可信甚至不连贯。尽管这些模型与民间对选择的心理理解背道而驰，但本文认为它们与广泛接受的双重认知过程理论是一致的。具体来说，我建议可以通过“默认干预主义”解释来解释政治无知，其中有偏见的直觉子系统会产生自动反应，当错误的预期成本很大时，这些反应会被理性反思所覆盖。这与理性无知和政治无知和偏见的相关理论是一致的。为理性的无知提供更强大的心理基础也表明了可以发展该理论以增加其预测性、分析性、